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The issues presented by-the intersection of the patent system
and the antitrust laws have never been as pressing as they are today.
The number of issued patents is skyrocketing. Companies are more
frequently entering into arrangements with competitors not only to
recover their investment from creating patented products but also to
avoid the patent landmines that line the path of innovation. They
form patent pools for laser eye surgery, MPEG-2 video compression
technology, and DVD formatting; enter into alliances, mergers, and
settlements in the biopharmaceutical industry; refuse to license their
patented products in various industries; and cross-license their
patents in the semiconductor industry.
But the need for collaborative and exclusionary conduct under
the patent system is matched by the heightened suspicion of the
antitrust laws. Antitrust looks at these patent-based activities and
sees competing firms conspiring to limit competition. It sees increased
price, reduced output, and lessened competition. And it pays scant
attention to the benefits of the activity in promoting innovation or the
justification for the activity based on the patent system.
Thus, the patent-antitrust paradox. Stated on its simplest
level, the patent and antitrust systems promote welfare in different,
often conflicting, ways: the patent system is based on exclusion, while
antitrust law focuses on competition. Since exclusion-based acts often
restrict competition, courts are left to reconcile two systems for
promoting welfare without any compass to guide them. One need not
look far to stumble upon their wayward path, as revealed by judicial
analyses based on the defendant's intent, the scope of the patent, the
presence of an essential facility, and the effect of the activity on
competitors.
This Article offers a paradigm to resolve the patent-antitrust
paradox.1 Three steps comprise the paradigm. First, the Article
proposes innovation as the common denominator of the patent and
antitrust laws. Second, it proposes a new explanation that firms can
offer in defense of the challenged activity: that it is reasonably
necessary to attain tripartite innovation. Tripartite innovation denotes
the three temporal stages of innovation: the creation of the product,
1. A portion of the analysis in the Article was introduced in Michael A. Carrier,
Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 816-40 (2002), which offered a
test to determine whether a defendant's patent-based conduct constituted monopolization. This
Article develops the building blocks introduced by its predecessor-namely, an industry-specific
approach focused on innovation-while introducing a justification based on tripartite innovation
and expanding the scope of inquiry from monopolization to the entirety of antitrust conduct,
including licensing agreements and combinations between competitors such as joint ventures
and mergers. For further discussion of the differences between the two approaches, see infra note
265.
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the recovery of the investment incurred in creating the product, and
the circumvention of patent bottlenecks that block the path of
innovation.
Third, the Article recommends a greater role for the
justification than that currently accorded to other explanations in
antitrust analysis. Specifically, a showing of reasonable necessity for
tripartite innovation should receive (1) immunity from a charge of
monopolization, (2) heightened consideration in the review of mergers,
and (3) greater weight in an asymmetric balance against
anticompetitive effects in the analysis of agreements.
The Article is constructed as follows. Part I sketches the
conflict between the patent system and the antitrust laws and
illustrates the range of approaches that courts and the federal
antitrust enforcement agencies recently have applied to the
intersection. Part II proposes innovation as the common denominator
allowing the reconciliation of the patent and antitrust laws. This part
relies on the text and legislative history of the relevant statutes,
courts' jurisprudence, and economic theory.
Part III introduces and develops the test of reasonable
necessity to achieve tripartite innovation. It explains the selection of
the standard of reasonable necessity and the three temporal
components of innovation. It then explores each of the three stages,
fleshing out the test and facilitating courts' analysis by providing
examples of activity that satisfy (and that fail to satisfy) the test. Part
IV concludes by applying the reasonable necessity concept to the
antitrust analyses of monopolization, agreements, and mergers.
I. THE PATENT-ANTITRUST CONFLICT
Although the patent and antitrust systems both attempt to
increase total societal welfare, 2 they pursue this goal through
divergent paths. The foundation of the patent system is the right to
exclude. Such an incentive is necessary, at least in theory, because of
the "public good" nature of patented inventions, which are nonrival
2. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000) (prohibiting trusts in restraint of
trade and monopolies); Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (2000)) (granting patents to inventors and discoverers of new and useful
processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter); see also WARD S. BOWMAN, JR.,
PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 1 (1973) ("Both antitrust law
and patent law have a common central economic goal: to maximize wealth by producing what
consumers want at the lowest cost." (emphasis omitted)). For a discussion of the distinction
between total welfare and consumer welfare, and an explanation of the superiority of total
welfare to noneconomic objectives as the goal of the antitrust system, see Carrier, supra note 1,
at 763-64 n.2.
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(consumption by one does not leave any less of the good to be
consumed by others) and nonexclusive (others cannot be excluded
from consuming them).3 As a result of these characteristics, "free
riders" are tempted to imitate the invention after it has been
developed, 4 which would deter future inventors and investors and lead
to a suboptimal level of innovation. 5 To prevent this, the patent laws
promise inventors a right to exclude for a period of twenty years, a
right that permits them to charge prices higher than their
postinvention costs, which allows them to recover profits in excess of
the value of their front-end investments.6 The right to exclude is
designed to increase appropriability and, consequently, the level of
innovation in society.7
The very exclusion that forms the foundation of the patent
system nevertheless may be punished under the antitrust laws. The
antitrust laws scrutinize activity that restricts competition on the
presumption that competition leads to lower prices, higher output, and
more innovation, and that certain agreements between competitors or
conduct by monopolists prevents consumers from enjoying these
3. See Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain: Markets in Information
Goods Versus the Marketplace of Ideas, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 270 n.9 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss
et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter EXPANDING BOUNDARIES]; DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES
OF PATENT LAW 58-59 (1998); Tracy R. Lewis & Dennis A. Yao, Some Reflections on the Antitrust
Treatment of Intellectual Property, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 606 (1995).
4. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 59; Nancy T. Gallini & Michael J. Trebilcock,
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy: A Framework for the Analysis of Economic
and Legal Issues, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 17 (Robert D. Anderson & Nancy T. Gallini eds., 1998).
5. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247,
247 (1994).
6. See F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 622 (3d ed. 1990).
7. The justification advanced in the text is the standard "utilitarian" justification that
most courts and commentators have articulated and that the Constitution contemplates. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries"); see also, e.g., SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 6, at 621-
24 (discussing the logic of granting protection from competition with patents). Other less
frequently voiced potential justifications for the intellectual property system (though not the
patent system) include the "moral rights" approach, see Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral
Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940)
(describing a creative act as an extension of an individual's identity); the related "natural rights"
approach, see JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laskett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (stating that individuals are entitled to the fruits of their labor, as long
as others are not worse off as a result of the privatization); and the "personhood perspective," see
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982) (stating that
an individual needs control over resources in the external environment that take the form of
property rights).
1050
PATENT-ANTITR UST PARADOX
benefits.8 Because, for example, monopolists lack the constraints
provided by competitive markets, they often reduce output, raise
prices, limit innovation (so as not to introduce products that might
dislodge their market position), or fail to allocate resources to the uses
most highly valued by consumers. 9
Similarly, agreements between patentees and licensees restrict
competition by their very operation. For example, patentees may
impose quantity restrictions, royalty payments, grantbacks,10
territorial restrictions, 1 or field-of-use restrictions1 2 on licensees. Most
of these agreements (at a minimum, those with exclusive provisions)
limit the amount of competition that would otherwise occur in the
market. On a larger scale, several patentees could share their patents
in a "patent pool" that excludes competitors or that jointly sets
royalties for patents contained in the pool.13 Patents also could form
the basis for a more permanent combination of the participants'
market power through joint ventures and mergers.
This broad range of activities may make perfect sense from the
standpoint of dispersing or exploiting the patented innovation.
Patentees may not be the most efficient actors to take advantage of all
the potential uses for their invention, or their patents may block the
products of other patentees, thus necessitating cross-licenses or patent
pools. The danger is that the greater need for cooperation and
coordination from the perspective of the patent system often will
trigger the heightened suspicion of the antitrust authorities. 14
8. See BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 1; William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of
the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 305 (1966).
9. See BOWMAN, supra note 2, at 1; HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A
MODERN APPROACH 420-24 (5th ed. 1999); Baxter, supra note 8, at 305. But see JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (3d ed. 1950).
10. Grantbacks are arrangements by which a licensee agrees to extend to the licensor of
intellectual property the right to use the licensee's improvements to the licensed technology. See
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.6 (Apr. 9, 1995) (hereinafter GUIDELINES].
11. The patent statute permits the exclusive licensing of a patent to "the whole or any
specified part of the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
12. Such a restriction limits the licensee's use of the patented invention to one or more
specified fields. See, e.g., Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 179-82
(1938).
13. See GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 5.5; infra Part III.E.2.b.
14. The systems also differ in (1) their divergent focal points (as intellectual property has
emphasized quality and investment while antitrust has looked to quantity and price) and (2) the
timing of review, where "the optimal IP policy generally is optimal in expectation (ex ante)," as
contrasted with the antitrust system, "which is optimal in every case (ex post)." Jonathan D.
Putnam, Intellectual Property and Competition Policies 5 (2002) (on file with author) (emphases
omitted).
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Courts have offered an array of analyses when confronted with
patent-based activity. And even those courts that have recognized the
procompetitive benefits of the patent system have made no attempt to
determine the degree of deference that would be appropriate.
Approaches that they have adopted include:15
" Antitrust immunity for patent-based activity unless the
challenged conduct involves tying patented and
unpatented products, fraudulently obtaining a patent, or
engaging in sham litigation; 16
" Immunity for activity taken within-and punishment for
activity outside-the "scope" of the patent; 17
* A presumption that a monopolist's reliance on its
intellectual property-protected products is lawful that can
be rebutted based on evidence of pretext; 8
* Acceptance (by the government agencies) of patent pools
for which the involved patents are complements and
challenges to pools composed of substitute patents; 19
15. Commentators have offered additional approaches that have not resolved the patent-
antitrust intersection. For a critique of the most sophisticated of the approaches, offered by
William Baxter, Ward Bowman, and Louis Kaplow, see Carrier, supra note 1, at 795-800.
16. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. v. Xerox Corp. ("Xerox"), 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-28
(Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Townshend v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No. C99-0400, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5070, at *26 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2000) ("Because a patent owner has the legal right to
refuse to license his or her patent on any terms, the existence of a predicate condition to a license
agreement cannot state an antitrust violation.").
17. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969); Ethyl
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940); Motion Picture Pat. Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917); Xerox, 203 F.3d 1322; United States v.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d
1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981).
For a critique of the test based on the scope of the patent, see Carrier, supra note 1, at 788-91
(contending that the test elevates patent over antitrust, ignores industry-specific variations in
achieving welfare, begs the question of what conduct lies within the scope of the patent, and can
be used to rationalize particular market definitions).
18. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. ("Kodak II"), 125 F.3d 1195, 1219
(9th Cir. 1997). For a critique of analysis based on a party's subjective intent, see Carrier, supra
note 1, at 793-94 (contending that intent tests prove too much in antitrust law since the purpose
of competition is to defeat one's competitors, that this result is particularly dangerous in
penalizing a defendant for its intention in refusing to deal when the purpose of the patent laws is
to exclude others from the patented product, and that numerous obstacles lie in the path of
determining a company's intent).
19. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Dep't of Justice
Antitrust Division, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell, (Dec. 16, 1998) (Sony DVD pool),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publiclbusreview/2121.htm; Letter from Joel I. Klein to
Gerrard R. Beeney (June 26, 1997) (MPEG-2 pool), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/-
public/busreview/1170.htm; In re Summit Technology, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9286 (eye surgery laser
pool), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9803/summit.cmp.htm.
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* Challenges to royalty-free licenses in industries containing
blocking patents and where parties deny access to
previously available technology; 20
" Punishment of a party's modification that improves the
original product but that leads to less compatibility with
complementary assets produced by competitors;21 and
* Failure to accord any deference to intellectual property. 22
Most of these approaches have not promoted the purposes
underlying the patent and antitrust laws. Some-like antitrust
immunity and deference to activities occurring within the scope of the
patent-defer excessively to the patentee. Others-focusing on the
defendant's intent, the reason for product improvements, and the
effect on competitors-do not sufficiently recognize the purposes of the
patent system.
The antitrust enforcement agencies' treatment of patent pools,
through a focus on the relationship between the involved patents,
promises a more nuanced analysis. How can the foundation of this
approach be extrapolated to the entirety of antitrust conduct? More
generally, how should antitrust courts consider patent-based activity?
The first step in the creation of a new approach, which is developed in
the next part, involves the selection of a common denominator that
allows courts to compare the patent and antitrust laws.
II. THE COMMON DENOMINATOR OF INNOVATION
Courts generally have pursued disparate objectives for the
patent and antitrust systems, focusing on innovation as the goal of the
patent system while emphasizing price or output effects under
antitrust law. What the patent-antitrust intersection calls for is a
common denominator-a means by which courts can weigh antitrust
against patent on a new scale with equivalent measures on both sides.
I have elsewhere proposed innovation as this common denominator. 23
This Article provides an abridged version of the argument.
20. Intel Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 9288 (June 8, 1998).
21. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The Bard court
dismissed the defendant's argument that the change constituted an improvement, instead
emphasizing subjective evidence-that the "real reasons" for the modification were to harm
competitors. Id.
22. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (dismissing as
"frivolous" Microsoft's copyright argument and stating that "[i]ntellectual property rights do not
confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws") (quoting In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.,
203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
23. See Carrier, supra note 1, at 800-15.
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Innovatior is the goal of the patent laws and one of several
important (and becoming ever more so) goals of the antitrust laws.
Innovation consists of the search for and the discovery, development,
improvement, adoption, and commercialization of new processes,
products, and organizational structures and procedures.24 Innovation
thus differs from invention in including not only the initial discovery
or the creation of potential new products or processes, 25 but also their
subsequent development and commercialization.
The patent system and competition are two primary catalysts
to innovation.2 6 Not surprisingly, innovation is at least a critical
objective of both the patent and antitrust laws.27
A. Patent Laws
Ever since the Framers of the Constitution authorized
Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"'28
invention and innovation have been the primary goals of the patent
laws. 29 The first patent statute enacted by Congress, the Patent Act of
24. Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation, and Antitrust, in
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 47, 48 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds.,
1992); see also C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM:
A STUDY OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 27 (1973) (innovation refers to the "process of converting
inventions into full-scale productive operations").
25. See TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 24, at 27.
26. Innovation typically requires the presence of other factors, such as the
availability of a labor force with the requisite technical skills; decentralized economic
structures that permit considerable autonomy and entrepreneurship; economic
systems that permit and encourage a variety of approaches to technological and
market opportunities; access to "venture" capital... ; good relationships between the
scientific community.., and the technological community, and between users and
developers of technology.
Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Introduction, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND
COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 24, at 6.
27. Despite the different routes the patent and antitrust laws take to achieve innovation,
the end result is the same: new and improved products and processes. These types of advances
are consistent with both the statutory requirements of the patent system and competition-based
incentives such as the race to arrive first in a market.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
29. See Baxter, supra note 8, at 312; Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent
Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106, 106 (1990); E. Thomas Sullivan, The Confluence of
Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the New Century, 1 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 1 (2000).
Even if the system is viewed more as rewarding the initial invention than the subsequent
commercialization of the product, see Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent
Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 809-10 (1988), this
distinction is not significant for our purposes because inventors typically will consider innovation
to be the closely related (and desired) successor to invention. See, e.g., RICHARD R. NELSON &
SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 263 (1982) (finding that
firms consider both business and technical risks in pursuing research and development).
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1790,30 offered "the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making,
constructing, using and vending"31 an invention to anyone who
"invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine,
or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used"32
that the patent board considered "sufficiently useful and important."33
The inventor also was required to provide "a specification in
writing... [that shall] distinguish the invention or discovery from
other things before known and used, [and] also to enable... [someone]
skilled in the art or manufacture ... to make, construct, or use the
[invention]."34 The Patent Act of 179335 offered defenses against claims
of patent infringement in circumstances in which the patentee did not
contribute to innovation-i.e., situations in which the invention "was
not originally discovered by the patentee, but had been in use, or had
been described in some public work anterior to the supposed discovery
of the patentee."3 6
Throughout the past two centuries, the patent system's
requirements of novelty, utility, nonobviousness, and enablement have
played critical roles in fostering innovation. The requirement of
novelty ensures that the invention is not "known or used by others."37
The prerequisite of utility guarantees that the product is useful.38
Nonobviousness ensures that the invention actually contributes to
technological progress, since the subject matter of the patent must not
be "obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains."3 9
Finally, the inventor must describe the invention so that a person
skilled in the art could make and use it, thereby disseminating to the
public the benefits of the invention. 40 Each of these requirements
30. Patent Act of 1790 § 1, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
31. §1.
32. §1.
33. §1.
34. §2.
35. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
36. Id.
37. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
38. See id. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
39. See § 103(a).
40. See§ 112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
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ensures that the patent system cultivates innovation-that future
inventors learn how the patented product was discovered, and that
new, useful, and nonobvious products are invented, developed, and
brought to market. 41
B. Antitrust Laws
In contrast to the patent laws, there is no universally accepted
goal animating the antitrust laws. Because the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation-the text and legislative history of the
Sherman Act-offer little guidance on the issue, this section relies
upon tools of greater import in antitrust analysis: judicial opinions
and economic efficiencies.
1. Statutes/Legislative History
The text of the Sherman Act fails to provide guidance on the
role of innovation-or any other efficiency or noneconomic factor-as a
goal of the antitrust laws. 42 Section 1 outlaws "every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade."43 Section 2 prohibits parties from "monopoliz[ing],
[ ] attempt[ing] to monopolize, or combin[ing] or conspir[ing] ... to
monopolize"44 any part of interstate or foreign commerce. Section 7 of
the Clayton Act prohibits a merger or acquisition whose effect "may be
substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly."45
41. For a discussion of how the legislative history of the patent statutes and courts,
decisions confirm the centrality of innovation to the patent system, see Carrier, supra note 1, at
805-06, 806 n.201.
42. The constitutional grant of authority for the antitrust laws is the Commerce Clause. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978);
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434 (1932).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). In full, section 1 provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000
if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
44. § 2. Section 2 states:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a
corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
45. § 18. Section 7 provides:
1056
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The vague language of the statutes does not shed light on the
objectives to be served.
Nor does the legislative history prove insightful, as it reveals
support for several potential goals: consumer welfare, the protection of
small businesses, the process of competition, and economic fairness. 46
The one issue concerning which the legislative history of the Sherman
Act is clear is Congress's intention that the courts would play the
primary role in the development of antitrust jurisprudence. Courts
were to turn to the "old and well recognized principles of the common
law" 47 in fleshing out gaps in the Sherman Act.48 The indeterminacy of
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Other somewhat less relevant provisions are section 3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits
exclusive dealing and tying agreements where the effect of such agreements "may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce," § 14, and
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which protects against "[u]nfair methods of
competition." § 45. This Article will not focus as directly on these provisions, as they do not play
as significant a role in the patent-antitrust intersection.
46. See Robert H. Bork, The Role of Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 21, 24
(1985):
In looking to the legislative history, one discerns repeated concern for the welfare of
consumers and also for the welfare of small business and for various other values-a
potpourri of other values. So far as I'm aware, Congress, in enacting these statutes,
never faced the problem of what to do when values come into conflict in specific cases.
The legislative history of the Clayton Act provides a more unified theme: the fear of the
"rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy." Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962); see also Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 234 (1960) (discussing the "singleness of
mind with which most proponents of the bill defended their handiwork"). Nonetheless, the
paucity of remarks addressing the effects of concentration on price, innovation, and efficiency
renders the legislative history unhelpful, particularly in ascertaining the intended role of
innovation. See Bok, supra, at 237.
47. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman); see also id. at 2457 ("It is the
unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common law and human experience, that is aimed
at by this bill, and not the lawful and useful combination."); id. at 3152 (statement of Sen. Hoar)
('The great thing that this bill does.., is to extend the common-law principles, which protected
fair competition in trade in old times in England, to international and interstate commerce in the
United States."); id. at 3149 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (noting the use in the debate of
"common-law terms" and "common-law definitions").
48. See id. at 2460 (statement of Sen. Sherman):
I admit that it is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful
and unlawful combinations. This must be left for the courts to determine in each
particular case. All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles, and
we can be assured that the courts will apply them so as to carry out the meaning of
the law, as the courts of England and the United States have done for centuries. [;]
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the text and legislative history, together with Congress's delegation to
the courts49 of the authority to develop antitrust jurisprudence and the
courts' full-fledged utilization of that delegation, requires analysis of
the case law in determining the propriety of innovation as an objective
of the antitrust laws.
2. Antitrust Jurisprudence and Economic Efficiencies
Throughout the past century, courts have played a versatile
role in developing antitrust law, which "has demonstrated tremendous
flexibility and has been highly responsive to changes in economic
thinking and policy."50 The courts have loosely interpreted antitrust
statutes and have treated antitrust legislation as "organic,"51 allowing
economic theory to inform the development of the law. 52 While the
modes of analysis (and attention given to economic reasoning 53) have
varied, the goal of maximizing economic efficiency 54 has been nearly
see also id. at 2456 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (stating that the courts "will distinguish
between lawful combinations in aid of production and unlawful combinations to prevent
competition and in restraint of trade"); id. at 4089 (statement of Rep. Culberson) ("Now, just
what contracts, what combinations in the form of trusts, or what conspiracies will be in restraint
of the trade or commerce mentioned in the bill will not be known until the courts have construed
and interpreted this provision.").
49. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
Statutes like the Sherman Act... were written in broad general language on the
understanding that the courts would have wide latitude in construing them to achieve
the remedial purposes that Congress had identified. The wide open spaces in statutes
such as these are most appropriately interpreted as implicit delegations of authority
to the courts to fill in the gaps in the common-law tradition of case-by-case
adjudication. [;]
Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) ("The legislative history
makes it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to the [Sherman Act's]
broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition."); William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law"Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661,
663 (1982) ("By adopting a common-law approach [to antitrust law], Congress in effect delegated
much of its lawmaking power to the judicial branch.").
50. Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and
the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 907 (2000).
51. Id. at 913. For a compilation of commentators embracing such an approach, see id. at
906 n.151.
52. Id. at 913.
53. Economic objectives were one goal before the 1970s, but not to the exclusion of
noneconomic factors. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972);
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 & n.14 (1966); United States v. Phila. Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 360 n.37 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213
(1959); Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1941).
54. Economic efficiencies are "decision[s] or event[s] that increase[ ] the total value of all
economically measurable assets in the society or total social wealth." Joseph F. Brodley, The
Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025 (1987).
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unanimously accepted for at least the past two decades. Courts today
begin and end their antitrust examination with economic analysis. 55
Of the economic efficiencies, courts have focused primarily on
allocative efficiency-the optimal allocation of goods and services to
consumers, typically through equating price with marginal cost-and
therefore have analyzed the effect of challenged practices on price or
output in the relevant markets. But at times, courts also have
analyzed innovative efficiencies. 56 In United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., for example, the court explained that the antitrust
laws permit "the process of invention and innovation... [as conduct]
which a competitive society must foster."57 Courts have upheld under
section 2 monopolists' alterations of products that affect
complementary products,58 introductions of new products that have
the effect of injuring competitors, 59 and failures to "predisclose" their
products to competitors. 60 Even the district court in the Microsoft case
declared a section 2 violation on the grounds that Microsoft's acts
"trammeled the competitive process through which the computer
Antitrust courts have considered three types of efficiencies: (1) allocative efficiency, which
refers to the allocation of goods and services to buyers who value them most, (2) productive
efficiency, which denotes the production of goods in the most cost-effective manner, and (3)
innovative efficiency, which signifies gains through the invention, development, and diffusion of
new products and production processes that increase social wealth. See id. (citation omitted);
PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 7 (5th ed. 1997).
55. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S.
717 (1988).
56. See, e.g., John J. Flynn, Antitrust Policy, Innovation Efficiencies, and the Suppression of
Technology, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 487, 497 (1998) ("[I]nnovation and production efficiencies have in
fact been a central concern of antitrust policy since the beginning, and have been a principal
reason for instituting some of antitrust's most doctrinally significant and successful cases.").
57. 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
58. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286 (2d Cir. 1979)
(noting that "it would be difficult to fault Kodak for attempting to design a [new] film that could
provide better results" than the old film). But see C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("the jury verdict of monopoly power must be sustained although the power
held ... in this market is based on the patent right").
59. See, e.g., Cal. Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979) (IBM
could "redesign its products to make them more attractive to buyers ... [It] need not have...
constricted its product development so as to facilitate sales of rival products."); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 440-41 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (upholding modification by IBM
of a plug device as a justifiable innovation even though it prevented the operation of interfaces
with competitors' peripheral devices), affd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th
Cir. 1980).
60. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281:
If a firm that has engaged in the risks and expenses of research and development
were required in all circumstances to share with its rivals the benefits of those
endeavors, this incentive [to innovate] would very likely be vitiated. Withholding from
others advance knowledge of one's new products, therefore, ordinarily constitutes
valid competitive conduct.
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software industry generally stimulates innovation and conduces to the
optimum benefit of consumers." 61 Finally, innovation efficiencies and
"innovation markets" have played a role in merger analysis. 62
In determining the relative significance of various types of
efficiencies, the findings of economists obviously are essential. The
consensus among economists since Schumpeter 63 is that the gains
achieved from innovative efficiencies dwarf those derived from
maximizing allocative efficiency and that innovation is the most
important factor in the growth of the economy. 64 Economic studies
61. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000) ("Microsoft
Conclusions of Law"), afFd in part and rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding that "any dampening of
technological innovation would be at cross-purposes with antitrust law"); United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 69 (D.D.C. 2000) ("Iicrosoft Findings of Fact") (finding that
Microsoft "stifled innovation" by computer manufacturers); id. at 111-12 (actions Microsoft took
against Netscape "hobbled a form of innovation that had shown the potential to depress the
applications barrier to entry sufficiently to enable other firms to compete effectively against
Microsoft in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems"); id. at 112 (concluding that
Microsoft restricted innovation by making it more difficult for developers to write cross-platform
Java applications).
62. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n. v. H.J. Heinz Co. & Milnot Holding Corp., 246 F.3d 708,
722-24 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting claim of Heinz and Beech-Nut, firms with the second and third
highest market shares in the market for baby food, that the merger was necessary to enable
them to launch new products to compete with market leader Gerber because they lack a
sufficient shelf presence and product volume in retail stores); United States v. Gen. Motors
Corp., Civ. No. 93-530 (D. Del. filed Nov. 16, 1993) (challenging merger between division of
General Motors and ZF Friedrichshafen, manufacturers of automatic transmissions for buses,
trucks, and other commercial and military vehicles on the grounds that it would reduce
competition in a global innovation market involving the design, development, and production of
medium and heavy automatic transmissions); Robert P. Taylor & Matthew E. Carswell, Research
into Developing a New Idea: Innovation Markets, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1996,
at 51, 56-59 (P.L.I. Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series
No. 449, 1996) (citing eight complaints brought by FTC alleging harm to competition in
innovation markets). "Innovation markets" consist of "research and development directed to
particular new or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and
development. The close substitutes are research and development efforts, technologies, and goods
that significantly constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the relevant research
and development." GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 3.2.3; see infra notes 288-90 and accompanying
text.
63. SCHUMPETER, supra note 9 (innovation leads to greater improvements in consumer
welfare than competitive pricing).
64. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: Should Judges and Juries
Make It?, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 24, at 31 ("At least
since Schumpeter wrote nearly fifty years ago, innovation has been thought to contribute far
more to our well-being than keeping prices closer to costs through competition."); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra
note 24, at 119, 122-23 ("An antitrust policy that reduced prices by 5 percent today at the
expense of reducing by 1 percent the annual rate at which innovation lowers the costs of
production would be a calamity."); Brodley, supra note 54, at 1026 ("Innovation efficiency or
technological progress is the single most important factor in the growth of real output in the
United States and the rest of the industrialized world."); F. M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, and
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have revealed that at least fifty percent of the increase in U.S. output
from the late 1920s to the late 1960s was due solely to technological
and scientific progress 65 and that declines in innovation contributed to
a reduction in the growth of business-sector productivity by roughly
sixty-five percent from the period from 1947 to 1973 to the period from
1973 to 1987.66 In contrast, the loss from monopolistic pricing is
substantially less than one percent of the gross national product.6 7
Buttressing these conclusions, innovation is more important
than ever in today's high-tech economy. The currency of today's
economy is new information and new technologies, not lower prices.
Fierce competition often is accompanied by major paradigm shifts that
"cause incumbents' positions to be completely overturned." 68 And the
tools that courts have traditionally applied to analyze allocative
efficiency-such as comparing price with the marginal cost of
producing the item-will often not be helpful today. New-economy
firms usually have high fixed costs, because of significant research-
and-development ("R&D") investments or the need to invest in
networks, but low marginal costs, because the cost of producing an
Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 1018 (1987) (stating that productive efficiency is "much more
important quantitatively" than allocative efficiency and that [long-run technological] efficiency
"is almost surely even more important"); Donald F. Turner, Basic Principles in Formulating
Antitrust and Misuse Constraints on the Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 485, 485 (1985) (noting that "in the long run, technological progress "contributes
far more to consumer welfare than does the elimination of allocative inefficiencies caused by non-
competitive pricing") (citation omitted).
65. EDWARD F. DENISON, ACCOUNTING FOR U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1929-1969, at 131-37
(1974); see also Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal
Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 579 (1992), at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/jorde2.htm (last visited Jan. 15,
2002). If anything, the percentage of economic growth resulting from innovation has increased in
the past generation.
66. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. DOC. NO. 100-154, at 300 (1988). Moreover,
the impact of innovation on consumer welfare likely is understated by productivity statistics due
to difficulties in measuring the superiority of new consumer goods. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra
note 6, at 614.
67. EDWARD F. DENISON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND
THE ALTERNATIVES BEFORE US 194, 199 (1962).
68. David J. Teece & Mary Coleman, The Meaning of Monopoly: Antitrust Analysis in High-
Technology Industries, 1998 ANTITRUST BULL. 801, 804; see also David S. Evans, Antitrust and
the New Economy, SF63 ALI-ABA 41, 52 (2000) (noting that in the initial race, new economy
companies "invest heavily to develop a product that creates a new category"; in subsequent races,
firms "invest heavily to displace the leader by leapfrogging the leader's technology"); Richard A.
Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, SF63 ALI-ABA 115, 121 (2000) (noting that network
monopolists "do not seem particularly secure against competition" because of very high rates of
innovation, large amounts of investment capital, and the rapidity with which electronic networks
can be activated).
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additional unit is insignificant. 69 Today's firms innovate on the belief
that the (at least temporary) market power they foresee will allow
them to charge prices exceeding marginal costs enough to compensate
them for their high fixed costs. 70
In short, any attempt to unearth the goals of antitrust will not
find guidance in the text and legislative history of the Sherman Act,
which are indeterminate on the issue.71 Nonetheless, the legislative
history reveals that Congress intended the courts to play the primary
role in developing antitrust jurisprudence, and for at least the past
generation, courts have emphasized economic efficiencies to the
exclusion of noneconomic objectives. Because innovation contributes
more to economic growth than any other type of efficiency, positing
that it is the most important goal of the antitrust laws is well
supported. 72
11. THE NEW JUSTIFICATION BASED ON TRIPARTITE INNOVATION
The selection of innovation as the primary objective of the two
systems removes one hurdle confronting the reconciliation of the
patent and antitrust laws. The next question is more complex. How
should courts factor into the antitrust equation patent-based activity 73
69. See Evans, supra note 68, at 49. Similarly, much of the intellectual property at the
heart of the new economy has significant fixed costs but de minimis marginal costs, as the cost of
creating the product is high but the cost of making an additional copy of the product is trivial.
See Posner, supra note 68, at 118.
70. See Evans, supra note 68, at 55; see also KEVIN G. RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE,
REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF PATENTS 1-2 (2000) ('The old
industrial era has been supplanted by a new knowledge-based economy in which ideas and
innovation rather than land or natural resources have become the principal wellsprings of
economic growth and competitive business advantage.").
71. Again, even though the objectives of the Clayton Act are more apparent, the role to be
played by innovation is not. See supra note 46.
72. Although innovation should be the primary objective of the antitrust laws, it is not the
only goal, and so the approach developed in the Article considers other outputs, such as price.
73. As a preliminary matter, the challenged activity must actually be based on a valid
patent to receive deference. Such activity would not encompass patents obtained by fraud or the
filing of sham litigation. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172, 177 (1965); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 999 (9th Cir. 1979).
Also not included would be activity that transparently is a cover for horizontal price fixing,
market allocation, or collusion. Such illegal activity could conceivably take place through
horizontal market division agreements among competitors, output or price restraints
implemented through patent pools, vertical price restrictions imposed at the behest of powerful
dealers, or collusive standard-setting organizations. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND
ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW §
24.2a, at 24-19, § 33.2, at 33-10 to 33-12, § 34.4b, at 34-20 to 34-21, § 35.2a, at 35-8 to 35-9
(2002). Of course, this caveat will only cover activity for which the transparency is apparent-
that is, activity for which the only use of the patent is to hide naked anticompetitive agreements.
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that promotes innovation? The first subinquiry involves the stage of
analysis where such consideration is to take place.
With the exception of per se analysis (which applies to activity
that generally 74 has only an anticompetitive effect), all antitrust
proceedings involve consideration of the anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects of the relevant practice. Typical anticompetitive
effects include an increase in price, a reduction in output, or
diminished innovation.7 5 Examining the patent-based justifications for
the challenged activity is not relevant to this inquiry. The
justifications often will explain the effects, as increased price or
decreased output are the expected consequences of the patent system,
in which the right to exclude allows patentees to raise price and
reduce output to recover their initial expenditures. But even an
explanation of the anticompetitive effects cannot affect their existence
or chart their magnitude. In other words, the amount by which price
increases or output decreases (or innovation is reduced) constitutes
the anticompetitive effect and is not informed by the purposes of the
patent system or the need for the challenged activity.
The patent-based nature of the defendant's activity can best be
analyzed at the stage of the defendant's justifications for the
conduct.7 6 Like the other justifications recognized by courts, reliance
on a patent typically will explain the existence of, and provide a
reason for, the anticompetitive effect. Acknowledged justifications
include limiting free-riding, 77  encouraging dealer investment,78
It is not to be applied where it appears that the anticompetitive effects of the arrangement
outweigh the procompetitive effects.
74. 'Tying" offenses, although often per se in name, receive more complex treatment in
actual analysis. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62
(1992) (describing the elements of a tying claim as including (1) two separate products, (2)
coercion, (3) market power in the tying product market, and (4) a not insubstantial amount of
commerce in the tied product market); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
498-99 (1969).
75. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
76. To be clear, activity that is a cover for horizontal collusion will not receive deference as
a patent-based justification. For example, courts have applied per se treatment to settlement
agreements between manufacturers of branded drugs and generics that take the form of "an
agreement between horizontal competitors to minimize generic competition and to allocate the
entire United States market for [the pharmaceutical] to [the branded drug manufacturer] during
the life of the [algreement." In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 699 (E.D.
Mich. 2000); see also In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1348-
49 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (finding that generic drug manufacturers "forswore competing with" branded
drug manufacturer "and promised to take steps to forestall others from entering that market for
the life of their respective agreements in exchange for millions of dollars in monthly or quarterly
payments").
77. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 969, 972 (10th Cir. 1994);
Western Trails, Inc. v. Camp Coast to Coast, Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-2063 (HHG), 1994 WL 773361
(D.D.C. June 16, 1994); Gemini Concerts, Inc. v. Triple-A Baseball Club Assocs., 664 F. Supp. 24,
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fostering market penetration,7 9 allowing a new product to be
developed,8 0 fostering quality,81 and advancing other procompetitive
objectives.8 2 In the context of intellectual property, the federal
antitrust enforcement agencies have recognized that licensing "can
facilitate integration of the licensed property with complementary
factors of production," which "can lead to more efficient exploitation of
the intellectual property."8 3 In particular, cross-licensing and patent
pools may "integrat[e] complementary technologies, reduc[e]
transaction costs, clear[ ] blocking positions, [ ] avoid[ ] costly
infringement litigation .... and promot[e] the dissemination of
technology."8 4
Because of either the importance of the patent system in
promoting innovation in certain industries or the danger of patents in
forestalling innovation in other settings, the defendant that relies on
its patented product typically will have an innovation-based
justification for the conduct. In certain industries, such as
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals, patents are the
critical catalyst to innovation.8 5 Patent-based activity in these
industries should count as a procompetitive justification in order to
encourage innovation. But even in other industries, such as computer
software and hardware, the Internet, and semiconductors, where
factors such as network effects and first-mover advantages are more
important than patents in achieving innovation, patent-based
collaboration will frequently be helpful for other reasons, such as
27 (D. Me. 1987); Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia Props, Inc., No. 82-0318-A, 1983 WL
1786, at *7 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 1983).
78. See, e.g., New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 848, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
79. See, e.g., Newberry v. Wash. Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 475 (D.D.C. 1977).
80. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. ("BMI"), 441 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1979);
Nat'l Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 605 (11th Cir. 1986); Southtrust Corp. v.
Plus Sys., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1517, 1524 (N.D. Ala. 1995); Nat'l Bank of Canada v. Interbank
Card Ass'n, 507 F. Supp. 1113, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
81. See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998); Servicetrends, Inc. v.
Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1042, 1066 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F.
Supp. 842, 919 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
82. See, e.g., Northeastern Educ. Television v. Educ. Television Ass'n, 758 F. Supp. 1568,
1578 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (increasing diversity of output); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New Eng.,
Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 799 (1st Cir. 1988) (preventing parts shortages); Net Realty Holding Trust v.
Franconia Props., Inc., No. 82-0318-A, 1983 AIL 1786, at *8 (E.D. Va. Jan. 20, 1983) (promoting
comparison shopping); Jetro Cash & Carry Enters., Inc. v. Food Distrib. Ctr., 569 F. Supp. 1404,
1416 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (same); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103,
1117 (D. Neb. 1981) (preserving integrity of game).
83. GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 2.3.
84. Id. § 5.5.
85. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
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circumventing patent bottlenecks. The clearing of patent roadblocks in
these situations allows innovation to proceed.
Because of the overriding importance of innovation for
economic growth, the most crucial justification a defendant can offer is
that the challenged activity promotes innovation. Other justifications
are legitimate, of course, but none can be as important as the one that
is tied to the greatest effect on economic growth and that promotes the
purposes of not only the antitrust system but also the patent system.
Nonetheless, more than the defendant's claim that the activity
promotes innovation is necessary. The next section forges the required
link that ties the challenged activity to innovation.8 6
A. Reasonable Necessity
Not every activity based on a patent automatically promotes
innovation. One can imagine, for example, competitors forming a
patent pool and primarily contributing patents that are market
substitutes, thereby limiting competition that would have occurred in
the absence of the pool without any countervailing benefit. Or a
patentee might license its product only on the condition that the
licensee refuses to deal with its competitors or purchases nonpatented
products from the patentee. A patentee could also utilize territorial
divisions that restrict where unpatented goods can be produced 7 or
enter into settlement agreements that only have the effect of
restricting competition.88 The range of potential activities that
nominally are based on a patent but that do not promote innovation
recommends the demonstration of a link between the activity and
innovation for the defendant to claim the innovation-based
justification.8 9
86. The requirement of a link should not diminish the incentives underlying innovation.
The only activity that will not be entitled to deference will be patent-based conduct that is not
reasonably necessary for innovation, a finite category that does not play a significant role in
promoting the purposes of the patent system. The numerous examples offered in this Article of
activity that is reasonably necessary to promote innovation will cabin the universe of actions
that will not be analogous to covered protected activity and will not receive deference. Moreover,
to the extent that parties adjust or justify their conduct in response to courts' analysis, the
modification of conduct to promote innovation (or at least the justification of it in those terms)
would have a salutary effect. Of course, a chilling effect theoretically could result from potential
antitrust liability for patentees, but such an (unlikely) effect is the inevitable consequence of
allowing the antitrust laws to play a role where patented products are involved.
87. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 73, § 33.6b.
88. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
89. The more such activity resembles a naked price-fixing or market-allocation scheme, the
more likely it is not patent-based activity. See supra note 73. But where such conduct is less
axiomatically a cover for horizontal conspiracies, a fuller analysis will be necessary.
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This link must have teeth. "Plausible" justifications for which a
post hoc rationale could be unearthed will not suffice. At a low enough
level of scrutiny, any activity remotely related to a patent would
satisfy a test of plausibility.90 The combination of a plausible rationale
and the range of possible activities related to the patent system would
lead to immunity for an overwhelming array of activity.91
On the other hand, the nexus cannot be impossible to prove, as
a matter of theory or of practice. One variant of such a test would
require the activity to be "absolutely necessary" or "essential" to
achieve innovation. The multiplicity and variety of possible business
practices preclude a confident conclusion that any particular activity
is required for innovation. The path between a firm's activity and
innovation cannot be delineated with mathematical precision, and
there may be many ways (for example, merger, joint venture, patent
pool, or license) to achieve innovation. Therefore, the requirement of
absolute necessity is too strict to constitute the link.
Another variant, although less foreboding in theory, is not in
reality. The less-restrictive-alternatives analysis innocuously asks
whether "a reasonable, less restrictive alternative to the [defendant's
restraint] exists that would provide the same benefits as the...
restraint."92 Stated in this manner, who could oppose such a test?
But for two primary reasons, courts cannot practically apply
the test.93 First, courts' focus turns naturally to whether less
restrictive alternatives exist, rather than to whether such alternatives
would achieve all of the defendant's objectives. The former inquiry is
possible and, given the benefits of hindsight, tempts courts to tweak
the activity so it appears a little less restrictive. 94 The latter inquiry,
Of course, certain activity is expressly authorized by the patent laws. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §
261 (2000) (a patentee may "grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent,
or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States"). But allowing such an
authorization as an absolute defense to the antitrust laws would leave no legitimate role for
antitrust to play in the attainment of innovation. Rather, such an authorization should be
considered, but should not distract from the ultimate focus, which targets the link between the
activity and the attainment of innovation.
90. Cf. Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 677
(2001) (noting that "[plausible efficiency justifications are, after all, easy to generate" and that
the test for specific intent to undermine competition "cannot be whether any plausible efficiency
justification can be conceived; for if that were the test, defendants almost never would lose").
91. The link thus requires more searching scrutiny than the "plausible" claim that the
integration of two products is advantageous. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d
935, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying a tying analysis).
92. Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1103 (1st Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., L.A. Mem'l Coliseum
Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
93. For additional arguments against the less-restrictive-alternatives analysis, see Michael
A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1336-38.
94. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
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in contrast, is unworkable. Who can know whether a different path
could have led to the same result? Not firms that consider the broad
array of business options and must suffer the consequences of the
choice, and certainly not courts far removed from such real-world
pressures. Speculation and hypothetical scenarios are the order of the
day when the inquiry involves conjectural alternatives that cannot be
tried, proved, or disproved.
Second, the search for less restrictive alternatives can always
uncover such an option: the only activity that does not have such an
alternative is the least restrictive alternative. So, for example, a court
can opine that a merger could have been replaced by a joint venture,
that an exclusive license could have been replaced by a nonexclusive
license, or that a substitute patent could have been excluded from a
patent pool. But such options may not be practical alternatives: a
license might not occur in the absence of a merger, for example,
because of transaction costs, strategic or irrational behavior, or
divergent views about the value of improvements. 95 Again, the timing
of the actors' decisions is telling: a company decides in advance
whether a particulaz activity will achieve its objectives; a court looks
backward after the fact and after the success of the activity (or lack
thereof) is apparent. But penalizing defendants for not using a less
restrictive alternative-which, again, would be present in each case in
which the defendant did not use the least restrictive alternative-is
not appropriate. In short, the less-restrictive-alternatives analysis
cannot effectively forge the link between the challenged activity and
innovation.
A nexus that requires more than mere plausibility while not
leading to stringent post hoc second-guessing is reasonable necessity.
Reasonable necessity ensures that the activity is needed for innovation
but not that it is absolutely required, a showing that would prove too
difficult. Reasonableness connotes activity that is "not extreme or
excessive" but rather "moderate or fair."96 In other words, it asks
whether the activity fairly or sensibly would be necessary to achieve
innovation. Moreover, such a standard is workable, as courts have
applied similar analysis in many other areas of law. They have, for
example, looked to the reasonable person to set the standard for the
95. See statement of Mark A. Lemley, Roundtable Discussion at the Federal Trade
Commission, Hearings on Competition and IP Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy,
34-43 (Feb. 25, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/020225transc.pdf.
96. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, at http://www.m-w.com (last visited Feb.
26, 2003).
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duty of care in negligence actions, 97 to determine whether there has
been a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, 98 and to ascertain
whether a work has value for purposes of obscenity law,99 among
many other instances. 100 In antitrust law, courts have successfully
applied the standard of whether the defendant's activity is reasonably
necessary to achieve a procompetitive objective. 01
Necessity is important to underscore the gravity of the link
between the activity and innovation. Even though the inquiry involves
reasonableness, the foundation is necessity-that the challenged
activity is needed for innovation. "Reasonable link," "reasonable
nexus," or "reasonably useful" does not provide the strength of
connection provided by necessity. Although the adjective "reasonable"
ensures a flexible analysis, the noun "necessity" forges a potent link
between the activity and innovation.
The proposed test thus asks whether the activity is reasonably
necessary to attain tripartite innovation. Having justified reasonable
necessity, the Article next turns to tripartite innovation, with the
following section introducing its three temporal stages.
97. See, e.g., Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 883 (N.C. 1998) (using the reasonable
person standard to define the duty of care in a negligence action).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2002) (providing that Fourth
Amendment seizure does not take place "[i]f a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the
encounter").
99. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1710 (2002) (noting that the relevant
question in determining the value of a work for purposes of obscenity law includes "whether a
reasonable person would find... value in the material, taken as a whole").
100. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) ("[T]o be actionable
under [Title VII], a sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively
offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in
fact did perceive to be so."); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("[Glovernment
officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known."); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (providing
exception to hearsay rule for admission of a statement "which was at the time of its making so
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the
declarant to civil or criminal liability.., that a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true").
101. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 970 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding
restraints to be reasonably necessary where they created product that would not otherwise have
been available); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 769 (D. Del. 1981)
(same); Newberry v. Wash. Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 475 (D.D.C. 1977) (finding that test was
met where restraint increased market penetration and improved service to customers); see also
Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1121 (D. Neb. 1981)
(finding test to be satisfied where agreement furthered professional or amateur athletic
endeavors); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 381 (D. Ariz. 1983) (same).
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B. Tripartite Innovation
Innovation occurs over time and at different stages in relation
to a particular patent. The first stage precedes the patent, the second
succeeds it, and the third takes place in the context of multiple
patents.
The first stage involves the creation of the product. Absent the
invention, development, and commercialization of the product, there is
no innovation. This stage of innovation is most consistent with
popular understandings of the term, traced back to the first patent
granted-for Samuel Hopkins' discovery of a method for making
potash from wood soap.10 2 Product creation is often difficult and
expensive, and so firms may enter into collaborations for the purpose
of facilitating such creation. Because this activity is the necessary first
step on the path of innovation, it must be encouraged. Antitrust
condemnation of such activity would threaten innovation and could
discourage patentees from entering into arrangements that would
facilitate the creation of products.
The second stage involves the recovery of investment expended
in creating the product. Through its provision of a right to exclude, the
patent system offers to the patentee a twenty-year period in which it
can recover its initial investment in the product by raising price,
entering into licensing agreements, or otherwise exploiting its
invention. 10 3 Accordingly, activities that do just that-even though
they might tempt antitrust scrutiny with their heightened prices or
reduced output-constitute the second protected stage of innovation.
It is important to recognize this second, less apparent stage of
innovation so that a role for deference in the antitrust analysis is
carved out for essential activity, the patent-related purpose of which
might not otherwise be recognized.
The setting for the third stage is not the individual patent at
issue but the overall path of innovation. In many industries,
102. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 9 (2d
ed. 1997). Potash is potassium carbonate, which was valuable for making glass and soap.
103. Admittedly, a period lasting twenty years does not necessarily lead to "optimal"
incentives for innovation. In fact, such an ideal system is beyond the reach of current economic
theory. See SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 9-10 (Comm. Print
1958) (noting that the reason for the length of patent terms "is probably more political than
economic"); id. at 79-80 ("No economist, on the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state
with certainty that the patent system, as it now operates, confers a net benefit or a net loss upon
society."); JOHN JEWKES ET AL., THE SOURCES OF INVENTION 253 (1958) ("It is almost impossible
to conceive of any existing social institution so faulty in so many ways. It survives only because
there seems to be nothing better."). Nonetheless, even if the shape of the optimal exclusion is
uncertain, the concept of a patentee's recovery of its investment through exclusion still applies.
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innovation is cumulative, with one generation's patented invention
based on those of previous generations. In these cases, activity that
encourages such post-patent innovation, such as licensing between the
initial inventor and the follow-on innovator, should be encouraged,
since the path of innovation might not continue absent such
agreement. Collaboration also could resolve "bottlenecks" by which
patents block innovation in the same or later generations of products.
For example, patent "thickets" in the semiconductor industry are
made up of hundreds, if not thousands, of patents that read onto one
product. In this setting, cross-licensing agreements and patent pools
are necessary to resolve the bottlenecks and should be encouraged.
The test only requires that one of the three stages apply. Each
stage is important to the path of innovation. Even if activity does not
contribute to the other two stages, its critical role in creating a
product, recovering investment, or circumventing bottlenecks is
essential for innovation and should be encouraged. Moreover, the
independence of the three stages and their different positions on the
innovation timeline frequently will result in the test of reasonable
necessity being satisfied for only one stage.
The next three sections will examine each of these three stages
of innovation and will ascertain whether various activities are
reasonably necessary to attain the innovation signified in the stages.
C. Stage One: Product Creation
The first stage of innovation involves the creation of the
patented product. 10 4 One straightforward example of activity that is
reasonably necessary for this stage occurs when the product could not
have been created absent the activity. For example, two small firms
that do not have the capability for research and development on the
scale necessary to discover a product can collaborate to pool their R&D
resources or can merge. 105 In the biotechnology industry, for example,
many mergers combine small firms that otherwise would not be able
to create particular products. 0 6
104. When this Article refers to the creation of a "product," the reader should consider not
just downstream commercialized products but also upstream research tools or even processes.
105. See Robert P. Merges, Antitrust Review of Patent Acquisitions: Property Rights, Firm
Boundaries, and Organization, in GALLINI & TREBILCOCK, supra note 4, at 111, 124 (noting the
significant role played by intellectual property in joint ventures, "especially those with an R&D
component").
106. See Walter W. Powell, Networks of Learning in Biotechnology: Opportunities and
Constraints Associated with Relational Contracting in a Knowledge-Intensive Field, in
EXPANDING BOUNDARIES, supra note 3, at 263.
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Similarly, where the activity makes it significantly easier to
create the product, the test of reasonable necessity would be satisfied,
as the material difference in the likelihood that the product would be
created renders the activity reasonably necessary to create the
product. Again turning to the field of biotechnology, no single entity
can "build a sufficiently strong research base to cover all the
therapeutic areas and technical advances," 10 7 and, as a consequence,
the participants in the field "have turned to all manner of joint
ventures, research partnerships, strategic alliances, minority equity
investments, and licensing arrangements to speed the process of drug
development and to compensate for their lack of internal
capabilities."' 10 8  Significantly reducing the time to market is
particularly critical in the pharmaceutical context, where new drugs
"sometimes assume life-and-death importance. 109
The test is not satisfied, however, where the activity only
makes it any easier to create the product: savings and efficiencies can
be found in nearly any collaboration, and this facilitation does not rise
to the level of reasonable necessity. 110 So moderate synergies and
107. Id. at 252.
108. Id. at 253. The field consists of "product-focused companies work[ing] on recombinant
protein therapeutics and small molecule therapeutics, as well as gene, antisense, and cell
therapeutics" and "[t]echnology-focused companies offer[ing] such novel enabling methodologies
as genomics, combinational chemistry, high-throughput screening, and bioinformatics." Id. at
252; see also Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical
Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 125, 126 (1998) (noting that because,
in many cases, "young firms lack complementary assets such as sales forces and manufacturing
know-how, which may take many years to develop[,] ... small, research-intensive firms
frequently rely on alliances with larger corporations"); David J. Mugford, Licensing of
Biotechnology: Introduction to the New Decade, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND LITIGATION 1990,
at 431, 445 (P.L.I. Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook
Series No. 287, 1990) ("[Mlore and more companies are voluntarily seeking codeveloping
partners and joint venturers who 'bring something to the table,' e.g., marketing strength,
development and regulatory expertise, etc., to share [high] development and regulatory costs.").
109. Sheila F. Anthony, Riddles and Lessons from the Prescription Drug Wars: Antitrust
Implications of Certain Types of Agreements Involving Intellectual Property, Remarks at the
ABA "Antitrust and Intellectual Property: The Crossroads Program (June 1, 2000), at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/anthony/stipOO0601.htm.
Reasonable necessity applies not only to the invention, but also to the development and
commercialization of the product. In the pharmaceutical area, the most costly and time-
consuming stage involves the downstream testing and development of a product whose molecular
structure has already been discovered. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
Collaborations that would bring products to market significantly faster should be found to be
reasonably necessary for innovation.
110. An alternative version of the test would lower the threshold of reasonable necessity,
allowing the activity described in the text to suffice, while simultaneously reducing the
significance in the overall antitrust analysis of a finding of reasonable necessity. This Article
employs a higher threshold of reasonable necessity, which unequivocally ensures that the
activity has a powerful innovation-based justification, one that deserves greater deference in the
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savings resulting from the combination of two complementary
research, production, or manufacturing facilities would not suffice. For
example, even if savings resulting from mergers in the pharmaceutical
industry between firms with the highest market shares or the
products closest to market may be a cognizable efficiency, they do not
satisfy the test of reasonable necessity for innovation."1
The analysis of whether the activity is reasonably necessary for
the creation of the product naturally takes place against the backdrop
of the relevant industry. The difficulty and expense of creating
products and, relatedly, the need for patents vary widely across
industries. Certain industries require the expenditure of significant
resources and time for the creation of the product. In the fields of
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, biotechnology (at least for downstream
innovation 12), and agricultural products, the search for the next
breakthrough can be prohibitive." 3
Biopharmaceutical companies' 14  often spend hundreds of
millions of dollars and take ten to fifteen years to bring new drugs to
market. 15 These companies must pass through multiple stages of
global antitrust analysis and, in particular, more weight in the calculus than adverse effects on
price or output.
111. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
112. See infra Part III.E.l.b.
113. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 6, at 627; W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 831 (2d ed. 1995); Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the
Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY
793, 809; FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTICIPATING THE 21sT CENTURY: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE
NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE [hereinafter FTC REPORT], ch. 8 ("Intellectual Property
and Antitrust Policy for New Technologies") at 6.
114. As the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries have converged in recent years,
they have often been collectively referred to as the biopharmaceutical industry.
115. See TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., OUTLOOK 2002, at 3, 4 (stating that the
cost of developing new drugs and bringing them to market averages $802 million and takes ten
to fifteen years), at http://csdd.tufts.edu/InfoServices/OutlookPDFs/Outlook2OO2.pdf (2002);
PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM. (PHRMA), PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFILE 2001, ch. 9
(2002) ("On average, it takes 14.2 years and costs $500 million to develop a new medicine."),
available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/profileOl/chapter9.phtml; Rebecca
S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This Market Failing
or Emerging?, in EXPANDING BOUNDARIES, supra note 3, at 253 (finding that it costs $175 to $300
million to develop a new biotechnology medicine and $300 to $500 million to develop a new
pharmaceutical drug).
Due to recent and potential future advances, conclusions relating to the biopharmaceutical
industry may need to be revisited. For example, the cost of locating a gene fragment of unknown
function is now an insignificant part--estimated by one CEO of a bioinformatics company to be
one percent-of the cost of determining its function. See Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution
Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-
Genomics Era, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 173, 192 n.88. Even the more difficult commercialization stage
might be simplified in the future by an expanded application of information technology to
genome data (i.e., genomics). See id. at 174-75.
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innovation, such as discovering the relevant molecules with
therapeutic effects, undertaking thorough clinical testing, undergoing
significant FDA review, and developing, manufacturing, and
marketing the drug.116 Only one out of every four thousand discovered
compounds tested in industry laboratories passes through each of the
stages and reaches the marketplace. 117 Moreover, biopharmaceutical
products "arise out of living systems, and are typically intended to
interact with other human or non-human living systems,"118 with the
result that the functionality of biotechnology products "is always
unforeseeable, and always involves a high degree of uncertainty and
risk."11 9 Similarly, R&D for new chemical products is uncertain and
subject to much experimentation, since it is difficult to predict the
exact chemical structure that will achieve a given end and since there
often are unanticipated effects of using a new chemical substance in a
particular way. 120
On the other hand, the creation of products is not as difficult in
many industries. Internet business methods-as symbolized in
Amazon's "one-click"' 2 ' patent-are usually simple ideas easily
116. Rai, supra note 115, at 181 (noting that prescription drug manufacturers must provide
preclinical testing on animals, file a drug application with the FDA, undertake three stages of
clinical/human testing, and undergo final FDA review); DANIEL RODRIGUEZ, DECISIONS OF
PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS FOR NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 19 (IPC Working Paper No. 98-006
WP, 1998) (on file with author); SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 6, at 626-27; TAYLOR &
SILBERSTON, supra note 24, at 231 (concluding, based on a study of the importance of patents in
Great Britain in the 1960s, that "[tihe pharmaceutical industry stands alone in the extent of its
involvement with the patent system"); W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST 848 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that after completion of the three testing stages, an
application is filed that covers clinical trials of more than 3,000 patients and that contains
90,000 pages; after two-and-a-half more years, the FDA gives its decision).
117. Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An Unreasonable
Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 303 (1994).
118. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific? 57 (2001)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
119. Id. Burk and Lemley reference the Centocor sepsis antibody, a "highly promising
biotechnology treatment" that "succeeded in passing many years of costly trials" but failed in the
final phase of FDA approval. Id. at 57 n. 174.
120. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, Market Structure and Technical Advance: The
Role of Patent Scope Decisions, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS, supra note
24, at 209. Again, this uncertainty applies to the chemical compounds in the pharmaceutical
area. See TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 24, at 252; supra notes 114-19 and accompanying
text.
121. Stated most simply, "one-click ordering" involves the server system "remembering"
information from the client system, such as the customer's address and credit card number, and
automatically recalling the information during the customer's subsequent order. See U.S. Patent
No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999); Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property,
Antitrust, and the New Economy, 62 PITT. L. REV. 453, 468 (2001).
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conceived. 122 Products are relatively easy to create in the civilian
aircraft, semiconductor, office equipment, motor vehicles, rubber
products, textiles, primary metals, instruments, food,
printing/publishing, steel, and electric components industries. 123 In
these industries, in which firms do not consider patents to be effective
appropriability mechanisms, 124 there is a reduced likelihood of firms
needing to enter arrangements to create products.
Therefore, in the biopharmaceutical, chemical, and agricultural
products industries, courts should be more likely to find that the
challenged activity is reasonably necessary to create the product.
Because it is so difficult to create products, more collaboration is to be
expected and is needed for innovation. The biotechnology field, again,
is characterized by a broad array of collaborations1 25 with fluid
arrangements among participants and competitors on one project
becoming partners on another. 126 The result is an innovating field,
with "external alliances accelerat[ing] the pace of drug discovery far
122. In fact, many such methods had already been utilized outside the Internet before being
patented.
123. See WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS:
APPROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NOT) tbl.1
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000); Richard C. Levin, The
Semiconductor Industry, in GOVERNMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY
ANALYSIS (1982); ALMARIN PHILLIPS, TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF THE
AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY (1971); J. R. TILTON, INTERNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE
OF SEMICONDUCTORS (1971).
124. See, e.g., COHEN ET AL., supra note 123, at 10 (noting that managers consider secrecy
and lead time to be two most effective appropriability mechanisms); Merges & Nelson, supra
note 120, at 217 ("[I]n most industries advantages associated with a head start, including
establishment of production and distribution facilities, and moving rapidly down a learning
curve, were judged significantly more effective than patents in enabling a firm to reap returns
from innovation"); Levin et al., supra note 113, at 796 (presenting a survey demonstrating that
managers in only the chemical and petroleum refining industries believed that process patents
were important, and managers in only the chemical and steel mills industries thought that
product patents were important, in their companies' R&D); F. M. Scherer, First-Mover
Advantages from Pioneering New Markets: Comment, 9 REV. INDUS. ORG. 173, 175 (1994) (noting
that in most corporations' R&D decisions, patents played "a minor role" and that "the necessity
of maintaining competitive leadership" and "profits resulting from customer belief in the
company's technological leadership" were more critical).
125. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. See also Rai, supra note 115 (discussing
vertical integration, strategic alliances, and mergers). The high frequency of unsuccessful
projects has led to difficulty in the biotechnology industry in attracting investment, further
justifying the need for collaboration. See JOSH LERNER, THE RETURNS TO INVESTMENTS IN
INNOVATIVE ACTIVITIES: AN OVERVIEW AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY (Harv. Bus.
Sch. & NBER, Working Paper, 1998) (on file with author); see also John M. Golden,
Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the
American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 167-72 (2001) (describing purpose of patent system as
means of attracting investment capital for small biotechnology companies).
126. Powell, supra note 107, at 259 (observing that "the playing field resembles less a horse
race and more a rugby match, in which the players frequently change their uniforms").
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more rapidly than a company establishing research capabilities solely
in-house."' 27 At a minimum, it would be much more difficult to create
products in the biopharmaceutical industry absent collaboration. 128
That is not to say that every collaboration in these industries
would satisfy the test. For example, settlements between
manufacturers of brand-name pharmaceuticals and makers of
generics by which the former pay the latter to delay entering the
market would not be reasonably necessary for innovation. 129 Moreover,
courts should skeptically view combinations (especially mergers)
between the only two (or two of only a few) firms in the market for
certain products or technologies, especially where such firms likely
would create the product or technology in the near future even absent
the merger. Such a view conforms to the enforcement agencies' actions
127. Id. at 266. Licensing is typical in the industry, with biotechnology companies using the
activity to receive funding, to "improve credibility and create public recognition in advance of
[an] IPO[, and to] access expertise needed for clinical testing, regulatory approval and
marketing," and pharmaceutical companies licensing to receive income, unblock cross-licenses,
avoid litigation, and because the product does not fit with the firm's marketing focus. Diane
Furman, Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Licensing and the Patent/Regulatory Background,
in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND LITIGATION 1998: PROTECTING YOUR CLIENTS' RIGHTS 7, 23-24
(PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 514, 1998);
see supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
128. An example of collaboration necessary for product creation involved Lilly and Sepracor.
Lilly, the manufacturer of the drug Prozac, sought an exclusive license from Sepracor for the
rights to a follow-on and allegedly superior product to Prozac. As former FTC Chairman Pitofsky
explained: "It was uncertain whether the follow-on drug would be approved by the FDA, how
soon it would come to market, whether and to what extent Lilly's patent on Prozac would have
blocked marketing of the follow-on drug, and whether it represented a meaningful advance over
Prozac." Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of
the New Economy, 16 BERK. TECH. L.J. 535, 552 (2001). Further, Prozac faced other competitors,
there was a range of generic manufacturers ready to challenge Prozac when it went off patent,
and "Lilly's distribution resources and scientific expertise made it likely that Lilly would bring
this new drug to the market much more promptly than would otherwise be the case." Id.
129. Such settlements have occurred under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 (commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act Amendments), which
provides expedited Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval for generic drugs. See II
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (FIFTH) 1085-86 (2002).
Under the Act, the generic challenger receives the right to market its version of the drug without
competition from other generics, and the brand-name manufacturer can obtain a thirty-month
stay of FDA approval of the generic drug by filing an infringement action against the potential
generic entrant. Id. at 1086.
For example, Abbott paid Geneva $4.5 million per month (significantly more than the $1 to
$1.5 million Geneva expected from entering the market) to delay entering the market for
terazosin hydrochloride, which treats hypertension and benign prostatic hyperplasia (enlarged
prostate). See David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 321, 332-33 (2000). The FTC also challenged Hoechst and Andrx, Schering-Plough,
Upsher-Smith, and American Home Products for similar types of agreements. Compl., In re
Schering-Plough Corp., No. C-9297, Mar. 30, 2001 FTC LEXIS 39 (2001) (No. C-9297); Compl., In
re Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., No. C-9293, Mar. 16, 2000 FTC LEXIS 16 (2000).
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in imposing conditions on merging parties 130 that possessed significant
market power in highly concentrated markets and that were expected
shortly to bring their product to market-namely, the mergers
between Glaxo and Wellcome,' 3 ' Upjohn and Pharmacia, 132 Baxter and
Immuno, 133 American Home Products and Cyanamid,134 Ciba-Geigy
and Sandoz, 3 5 and Pfizer and Warner-Lambert. 3 6 The proposed
130. Reasonable necessity is determined with respect to a particular challenged (patented)
product. Of course, a merger between two competitors often will combine market power over a
range of other products. Such an expansive consequence of the activity raises the likelihood of
anticompetitive effects and is considered below. See infra Part IV.C.
131. In re Glaxo plc, 119 F.T.C. 815, 816-17 (1995) (imposing condition on merger between
Glaxo plc and Wellcome plc requiring that Wellcome divest its worldwide R&D assets for
noninjectable drugs where the two firms were the furthest along in developing an oral drug for
migraine attacks and Glaxo would have had an incentive to reduce its R&D because the merged
firm would not face competition to introduce an oral drug until a third firm completed the FDA
approval process many years later); see also William J. Baer, Antitrust Enforcement and High-
Technology Markets, Address at the ABA Sections of Business Law, Litigation, and Tort and
Insurance Practice (Nov. 12, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/ipat6.htm;
Press Release, FTC, Glaxo To Settle FTC Charges, Will Divest Wellcome Assets to Consummate
Merger (Mar. 16, 1995), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F95/glaxo-wellcome.htm.
132. In re Upjohn Co., 121 F.T.C. 44, 46 (1996) (imposing condition on merger between
Upjohn and Pharmacia requiring Pharmacia to divest its inhibitor drug for the treatment of
colorectal cancer where the firms are "two of only a very small number of firms currently in the
advanced stages of developing topoisomerase I inhibitors for the treatment of colorectal cancer"
and where Upjohn's product was expected to be the first inhibitor on the market and Pharmacia
planned to seek FDA approval within the next few years).
133. FTC Decision in Baxter/Immuno Acquisition to Preserve Competition in Two Markets
for Plasma Products Ensuring Lower Prices for Consumers and Continued Research and
Development, 1996 WL 727106, at *1 (Dec. 19, 1996) (imposing a condition on the merger
between Immuno International and Baxter International requiring Baxter to divest its Factor
VIII inhibitor (which helps to overcome hemophiliacs' immune responses to treatment) and to
license Immuno's fibrin sealant (products used to stop bleeding and to promote wound healing)
where the firms "are the only two companies marketing products in the United States to treat
hemophiliacs with Factor VIII inhibitors" and are "two of only a few companies seeking [FDA]
approval to market fibrin sealants in the United States").
134. In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 119 F.T.C. 217, 219-20 (1995) (imposing condition on
merger between American Home Products ("AHP") and Cyanamid requiring AHP to divest its
tetanus and diphtheria vaccine business because the firms were actual competitors in the "highly
concentrated" markets of (1) the manufacture and sale of combined tetanus and diphtheria
vaccine for use by adults and children at least seven years old; (2) the manufacture and sale of
combined tetanus and diphtheria vaccine for children between the ages of seven months and two
years; (3) the manufacture and sale of tetanus toxoid; and (4) the research and development of a
Rotavirus vaccine; and that Cyanamid was an existing seller and AHP was a potential
competitor in (5) the highly concentrated market for cytokines for white blood cell and platelet
restoration).
135. In re Ciba-Geigy Ltd., No. 961-0055, 1996 F.T.C. LEXIS 701 (Dec. 15, 1996) (imposing a
condition on the merger between Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz requiring licensing of a package of gene
therapy technology, know-how, and patent rights to third party where firms are "the two leading
commercial developers of gene therapy products" and were "engaged in rival research,
development and testing efforts that were [shortly] expected to yield significant improvements in
the treatment of cancer and other diseases and medical conditions"); see also David A. Balto &
James F. Mongoven, Antitrust Enforcement in Pharmaceutical Industry Mergers, 54 FOOD &
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merger between Pfizer and Pharmacia, which would make the largest
pharmaceutical company in the world (Pfizer) even larger, also
warrants scrutiny. 137
On the other side, certain activity in industries in which it is
not costly to create products might be found to be reasonably
necessary to attain innovation. Small companies, or those with limited
research and production capacities, will be more likely to need
collaborative activity to create products. But the likelihood that
activity is reasonably necessary to create a product in most industries
will be significantly less than in the areas of biotechnology,
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and agricultural products.
In short, the activity at issue, capabilities and market positions
of the participants, and relevant industry will inform the
determination of whether the challenged action is reasonably
necessary to create the product.
D. Stage Two: Recovery of Investment
If innovation consisted only of the initial creation of the
product, and if patentees were able effortlessly to recover their
investment in the product, then activities by which the patentee
sought to exploit its creation would not be entitled to heightened
DRUG L.J. 255, 268 (1999) ('The firms' combined position in gene therapy research was so
dominant that other firms doing research in this area needed to enter into joint ventures, or
contract with either Ciba-Geigy or Sandoz, to have any hope of commercializing their own
research efforts.").
136. See Compl., Pfizer, Inc. & Warner-Lambert Co., No. C-3957, June 17, 2000 (noting that
the merger would "increase... the likelihood that the merged entity would unilaterally delay,
deter or eliminate competing programs to research and develop EGFr-tk inhibitors for the
treatment of cancer, potentially reducing the number of drugs reaching the market and thus
resulting in higher prices for consumers"), cited in Susan DeSanti & William Cohen, Competition
To Innovate: Strategies for Proper Antitrust Assessments, in EXPANDING BOUNDARIES, supra note
3, at 330 n.75.
In the pharmaceutical industry, "a regulatory approval process limits the ability of late-
comers to catch up with competitors already engaged in the R&D... [since] the FDA approval
process requires a series of clinical trial periods, data collection and analysis from those clinical
trials, and expenditures of significant resources over a period of many years," preventing an
entrant from " 'leap-frog[gingj' into the drug product market or significantly catching up with
merging innovation efforts." Id. at 335.
137. Even though the combined company would have twelve products having an annual
revenue exceeding $1 billion (including Celebrex and Bextra (arthritis painkilling medications),
Lipitor (cholesterol), Zoloft (depression), Viagra (sexual dysfunction), and Rogaine (baldness.
treatment medication)), it would have few overlapping products and only an eleven percent
market share. See, e.g., Bill Brubaker, Pfizer Buys Rival Pharmacia for $60 Billion; Top
Drugmaker Does Not Expect Antitrust Problems, WASH. POST, July 16, 2002, at E01; Nicholas
Kulish, Pharmaceuticals Firms' Pact Raises Few Antitrust Concerns, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 17,
2002, at A4.
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deference. But such recovery often is far from certain. Although not as
apparent as product creation, a patentee's recovery of its investment
from the invention, development, and commercialization of the
product is just as important since without the promise of such
recovery, future innovation would be less likely.138
Moreover, it is usually more efficient for the patentee to enter
into licensing agreements with parties that own complementary assets
or capabilities.13 9 As the Intellectual Property Guidelines explain,
intellectual property "typically is one component among many in a
production process" which "derives value from its combination with
complementary factors [such as] manufacturing and distribution
facilities, workforces, and other items of intellectual property."140 To
realize the commercial value of the patent, the patentee must
collaborate with others. 141 In particular, licensing "can facilitate
integration of the licensed property with complementary factors of
production," which "can lead to more efficient exploitation of the
intellectual property, benefiting consumers through the reduction of
costs and the introduction of new products."'142 These arrangements
also "increas[e] the expected returns from intellectual property," thus
"promot[ing] greater investment in research and development."'143
A patentee can utilize a broad range of licenses, which may
include customer, territorial, and field-of-use restrictions and various
types of royalties.144 Field-of-use and geographic restrictions allow the
patentee to offer rights to licensees that are "presumably rights
tailored to the licensee's strengths," a highly efficient "matching of
complementary assets."'4 5 The restrictions also may "protect[ ] the
licensee against free-riding on the licensee's investments by other
licensees or by the licensor" or may "increase the licensor's incentive to
license, for example, by protecting the licensor from competition in the
138. Cf. Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1582 (2002) ("If technological advances transform reverse
engineering so that it becomes a very cheap and rapid way to make a competing product,
innovators may not be able to recoup their R&D expenses .... ); Teece & Coleman, supra note
69, at 824 ("It is the quest for profits that encourages innovation in the first place.").
139. See, e.g., Patrick Rey & Ralph A. Winter, Exclusivity Restrictions and Intellectual
Property, in COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 168.
140. GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 2.3.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. This exploitation also can take the form of refusals to license the patented product to
competitors where the patentee licenses the product itself.
144. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
145. CARL SHAPIRO, COMPETITION POLICY AND INNOVATION (STI Working Paper 19, 2002) (on
file with author).
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licensor's own technology in a market niche that it prefers to keep to
itself."146
In determining whether the challenged activity is reasonably
necessary to recover investment, courts need not ascertain whether
the particular agreement chosen constitutes the most efficient
utilization of the patentee's product. Nor need the court determine if a
royalty, for example, is precisely correlated with the patentee's
recovery of investment. All that the court must decide is whether the
license generally seems appropriate for allowing the patentee to
exploit and distribute its product. If the licensee offers complementary
capabilities or a wider dissemination of the product, for example, the
activity typically will be reasonably necessary to recover the
patentee's investment.
Where, on the other hand, the license seems to be a means for
competitors with similar capabilities to restrict competition; 147 where
exclusive licenses with suppliers allow firms to increase price by
extraordinary (e.g., 3200%) amounts; 148  and where brand-name
pharmaceutical companies (a) improperly list patents in the FDA's
"Orange Book" (a summary of drugs and patents) shortly before the
expiration of the patent term, (b) file infringement lawsuits against
generic drug firms ready to enter the market, and (c) receive an
automatic thirty-month stay on FDA approval of the generic drug,149
the license will not be reasonably necessary for innovation.
In industries in which the patented product is easy to invent
around, courts should be particularly sensitive to the patentee's need
to recover its investment. The faster a competitor can invent around
the patent, the faster a patentee will lose market share to substitute
products and, consequently, the shorter the period in which the
146. GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 2.3.
147. A leading treatise indicates that collusion between patentee and licensee is easiest
when "(1) a relatively small number of equal and equally efficient firms, (2) collectively dominate
a properly defined antitrust market, (3) which is protected by high entry barriers, and (4) make a
fungible product, (5) which is sold under terms that are readily observable by others."
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 73, § 30.4, at 30-13.
148. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Mylan Lab., Inc., No. 1:98CV03114 (TFH) 29 (D.D.C. Feb.
8, 1999) (amended complaint filed under seal) (alleging that a five-hundred-count bottle of 7.5
mg clorazepate tablets increased in price more than 3200%, from approximately $11.36 to
$377.00), available at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9902/mylanamencmp.htm [hereinafter Mylan
Complaint]; Mylan, Nation's Second Largest Generic Drug Maker, Charged with Restraint of
Trade, Conspiracy & Monopolization, FED. TRADE COMM'N, (Dec. 21, 1998) (contending that
effect of exclusive licenses with specialty chemical manufacturers for active pharmaceutical
ingredients (chemicals that allow drug to affect body) "was to prevent any other generic drug
manufacturer from using that supplier's API to sell that drug in the United States"), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1998/9812/mylanpv.htm.
149. Theresa Agovino, Drug Patents Get Attention of Regulators, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Jan.
24, 2002, at E4.
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patentee can recover its investment. 150 In industries such as chemical
structures, fabricated metals, food processing, and simple machinery,
where innovations are easy to imitate, 151 the patentee should receive
greater leeway in recovering its investment.
On the other hand, the more difficult reverse engineering and
imitation is, as in complicated mechanical engineering industries such
as aircraft, guided missiles, and complex industrial machinery,' 52 the
less necessary the patent is, and the more skeptical a court can be that
the patentee needs assistance in recovering its investment. While the
patentee still can contract with licensees that offer efficient
dissemination of the product, a more searching scrutiny might
question borderline transactions.
The second stage of innovation is related to the first. In
industries in which the cost of creating the product is significant,
courts should afford more leeway to patentees to recover that cost. But
there is an independent role for the second stage, in particular in
allowing the patentee to recover its modest investment in industries in
which there are not significant costs to create the product.
In short, the second stage carves out a role for courts to
consider activity necessary to recover investment-a category of
activity that otherwise could be viewed suspiciously, unlinked from its
role in the process of innovation.
E. Stage Three: Circumventing Bottlenecks
The context of the third stage of innovation expands from the
patented product to the multipatented path of innovation. Where
multiple patented inputs make up a product or where access to earlier
150. Cf. Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 139, at 1587:
[A] reverse engineer "will generally spend less time and money to discern th[e] know-
how [required to construct the innovator's product] than the initial innovator spent in
developing it, in part because the reverse engineer is able to avoid wasteful
expenditures investigating approaches that do not work, and in part because advances
in technology typically reduce the costs of rediscovery over time.
151. See, e.g., SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 6, at 626; TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 24,
at 251; VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 117, at 851; Richard C. Levin, Patents in Perspective, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 519, 521 (1985).
For example, for chemical structures, bulk manufacture and formulation methods can readily
be imitated after the correct compound and processes are established. As a result, certain generic
pharmaceutical firms copy brand-name products as soon as the brand product's patent expires.
See TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 24, at 252; VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 113, at 851; Burk &
Lemley, supra note 118, at 58 (noting that generics wishing to imitate an innovator's drug "face
substantially lower costs and uncertainty than do innovators" in the industry because they
confront "a substantially more streamlined" process, with the most significant hurdle being the
demonstration of bioequivalence to the innovator's drug).
152. See Levin, supra note 151, at 521.
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generations of products is required for innovation, the presence of
potential obstacles increases significantly. This Article refers to such
holdups or obstacles as "bottlenecks. '15 3
Bottlenecks can take one of two forms. The first occurs in
industries marked by cumulative innovation, where each product
generation builds on its predecessor. In these industries, the earlier
inventor can create a bottleneck by refusing to license its product,
which is the necessary building block for subsequent innovation. This
Article refers to such a setting as a bottleneck between generations, or
"intergenerational bottleneck." The second type of bottleneck occurs
when one product contains multiple patented components. Here, a
refusal by one of the patentholders to license its component part will
prevent the invention from being practiced. This holdup will be
referred to as a bottleneck within a generation, or "intragenerational
bottleneck."
1. Intergenerational Bottlenecks
Intergenerational bottlenecks naturally are important in
industries marked by cumulative innovation. This section will provide
an overview of cumulative innovation, offer an example of an
intergenerational bottleneck from the field of biotechnology, and
discuss activity that circumvents bottlenecks.
a. Cumulative Innovation
Cumulative innovation proceeds in a sequential fashion, with
innovators "build[ing] on each other's discoveries."154 Industries
marked by this type of innovation require nuanced analysis: the
optimal breadth of patents is unclear, since stronger patent protection
153. The term "bottleneck" has been used in connection with the "essential facility" doctrine,
by which a monopolist must share with competitors facilities that are deemed essential to
compete in the market. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973);
United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T,
708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir. 1982). The Article selects this phrase-as opposed to, for example,
"essential facility," which the elasticity of language and judicial interpretation have expanded
beyond true essentiality-to emphasize the actual impasse that can result from blocking patents.
154. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, CUMULATIVE INNOVATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (GSPP
Working Paper, 1999) (on file with author). See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
Some industries will not encounter the problem of cumulative innovation and therefore will
not suffer intergenerational bottlenecks. The toy, consumer goods packaging, and power hand
tool industries are examples of industries with discrete inventions. See Robert P. Merges &
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 880
(1990). Products in these industries do not incorporate numerous interrelated components and
are not integral components of a larger product or system.
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helps the initial innovator but hurts subsequent (or "follow-on")
innovators, and licensing is critical to keep the path of innovation
flowing. 155
Cumulative innovation occurs in two primary contexts. In the
first, "basic" upstream research is the building block for downstream
product applications. The basic research, which has no commercial
value by itself, creates gateways-often referred to as enabling
technologies or research tools-to products. 156 The second context
involves lengthy sequences of products, each of which improves upon
its predecessor, which are known as "quality ladders."157
Cumulative innovation occurs in industries as diverse as
automobiles, aircraft, biotechnology, semiconductors, computer
hardware, and computer software. 158 Computer software, for example,
can be viewed as "a series of inventions piled on top of each other."1 59
Incremental improvement in computer programs offers several
advantages: enhancing interoperability, rendering programs more
stable, and responding to hardware-based architectural constraints in
the industry.1 60 The chemical industry has attributes of both the
discrete and cumulative models, as the complex relationship between
chemical structure and function precludes cumulative development,
but processes are improved in a cumulative fashion.1 61 And science-
155. See generally Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 154.
156. SCOTCHMER, CUMULATIVE INNOVATION, supra note 154, at 10. Scotchmer notes that
some of the gateways lack substitutes (such as gene sequences allowing pharmaceutical firms to
search for targeted drugs), and others do not (as in multiple methods to insert foreign genetic
material into a germplasm). Id.
157. Id. at 10, 13. Quality ladders have appeared in the computer hardware (286, 386, and
486 chips), software (spreadsheets and word processors), and biotechnology (bioengineered
insulin) industries. Id. at 13.
158. Jorde & Teece, supra note 24, at 48; Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The
Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry,
1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101, 102 (2001); Levin et al., supra note 113, at 788; SCOTCHMER,
CUMULATIVE INNOVATION, supra note 154, at 1. Also, molecular biologists consistently have
relied on a technique for inserting genes into bacteria developed in the early 1970s, and drugs
like insulin and antibiotics have been improved through successive innovations. See Scotchmer,
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 154, at 29.
159. FTC REPORT, supra note 113, ch. 8, at 18; Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants, supra note 154, at 29. Bessen and Maskin demonstrate that because of the sequential
and complementary nature of innovation in the software industry, patent protection has reduced
innovation and social welfare. They substantiate their hypotheses with observations of cross-
licensing in the computer and semiconductor industries, the positive relationship between
innovation and firm entry, and the correlation between the extension of patent protection to
software in the 1980s and a relative decline in R&D activity. See JAMES BESSEN & ERIC MASKIN,
SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION, PATENTS, AND IMITATION (MIT Working Paper No. 00-01, 2000),
available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patent.pdf.
160. Burk & Lemley, supra note 118, at 52.
161. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 154, at 882-83.
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based technologies (such as biotechnology, lasers, and
superconductors) also emphasize cumulative development, with R&D
efforts seeking to exploit recent scientific advances. 162
Across the entirety of industries marked by cumulative
innovation, intergenerational bottlenecks can block the path of
innovation, with the latest product generation held hostage to its
predecessor. Such holdups are the inevitable consequence of (1) the
incremental fashion in which innovation proceeds in certain industries
and (2) the patent system, which awards improvement patents to
inventions that may be nonobvious to a person skilled in the relevant
art but nonetheless cannot be practiced without infringing the earlier
patent. 163 The presence of bottlenecks in industries with cumulative
innovation thus necessitates licensing between the initial and follow-
on innovator.
Licensing is especially needed for broad patents, which claim
an expansive scope of subject matter. Such patents constitute the
traditional bottleneck covering the field and precluding subsequent
breakthroughs in the absence of licensing. 164 The lack of follow-on
innovation in this context would have devastating consequences not
only in obstructing the path of innovation but also in discouraging
future inventors, who would be less likely to innovate because they
could not exploit the subsequent generation of invention. 165 Moreover,
licensing can prevent often inefficient inventing around of the
patented product, since a licensee gets the benefit of the labor that the
162. See id. at 883.
163. See 35 U.S.C. § 103:
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Merges and Nelson describe the situation of blocking patents as one patentee having a broad,
"dominant" patent on an invention and another having a narrower, "subservient" patent on an
improved feature of the invention. Merges & Nelson, supra note 154, at 860-61. Neither of the
patentees can practice their invention since, absent a license, the holder of the dominant patent
cannot practice the improved feature claimed in the narrower patent, and the holder of the
subservient patent cannot practice the invention. Id.; see also Gilbert Goller, Competing,
Complementary and Blocking Patents: Their Role in Determining Antitrust Violations in the
Areas of Cross-Licensing, Patent Pooling and Package Licensing, 50 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 723, 723
(1968) ("A patent is 'blocked' if its production would infringe the broad claims of an unexpired
prior basic patent.").
164. For a discussion of broad patents, see infra note 197.
165. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Competition Policy and Innovation: The Context of Cumulative
Innovation, Testimony at the U.S. Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission Hearings
on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Feb.
26, 2002 [hereinafter Hearings on Competition and IP Law]; see also Merges & Nelson, supra
note 154, at 908 (blockages resulted in broad patents on components in cumulative industries,
particularly when a multicomponent system was involved).
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patentee has undertaken and. does not need to spend resources
devising an alternative to the already discovered protected product.1 66
The need for licensing, however, sometimes outpaces its use. As
Mark Lemley has detailed, there are an array of reasons why efficient
licensing might not occur: (1) the "significant" transaction costs of
intellectual property licenses (which include difficult valuation,
uncertain patent scope, the difficulty of measuring and monitoring
contractual performance, 67 an ongoing relationship between the
parties, and complex assignments of partial legal rights); (2)
uncertainty, primarily (once again) over the difficulty of valuation 168
and scope of the patent; 169 (3) externalities; (4) strategic behavior; and
(5) noneconomic (perhaps irrational) incentives. 170 These costs are
particularly severe given the immense uncertainty about the path of
new technologies, as revealed by the development of radio, plastics,
computers, and VCRs. 171
Several historical examples have demonstrated the "bargaining
breakdown 172 that has occurred when different generations of
inventors are not able to enter into licenses. The development of radio
was stalled by a stalemate lasting ten years between the Marconi
Wireless Telegraph Co. (which owned an oscillating radio tube in the
form of a diode patent) and Lee DeForest (who owned an improved
design in the form of a triode patent).173 The formation of RCA years
later resolved the impasse and revealed the inefficiency of the
stalemate, as its sales growth rose from $1.5 million in 1921 to almost
$600 million in 1929.174 Similarly, the grant of Thomas Edison's
patent encompassing the use of a carbon filament as the source of
light slowed the pace of improvements in the industry as Edison's
166. See SCOTCHMER, CUMULATIVE INNOVATION, supra note 154, at 15.
167. Deepak Somaya & David J. Teece, Combining Inventions in Multi-invention Products:
Organizational Choices, Patents, and Public Policy 22 (2000) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).
168. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2655, 2657-59 (1994).
169. The scope of the patent is unclear because of "drafting ambiguities,... the doctrine of
equivalents, and... uncertainty about the validity of the patent." Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1056 n.305 (1997).
170. Id. at 1053-61. Other transaction costs include technological interconnectedness, the
transfer of tacit know-how, the strategic isolation of rents, and diffuse entitlement problems. See
Somaya & Teece, supra note 167, at 13-17.
171. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case
of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 86 (1994).
172. Id. at 84.
173. Id. at 84-85.
174. LEONARD S. REICH, THE MAKING OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH: SCIENCE AND
BUSINESS AT GE AND BELL, 1876-1926, at 297 n.21 (1985).
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company failed to improve the patent or to license it. 175 Finally, the
Wright brothers' patent on an expansive airplane stabilization and
steering system limited the pace of aircraft development in the United
States, which was relieved only during World War I when the
Secretary of the Navy insisted on automatic cross-licensing. 176
Analogous concerns have been raised about licensing in the
biotechnology industry.
b. Biotechnology Anticommons
The recent proliferation of upstream patents on biomedical
research has threatened innovation in the field. Heller and Eisenberg
have written about an "anticommons," in which "multiple owners each
have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has
an effective privilege of use."1 77 Resulting from the privatization of
biomedical discoveries in the past two decades, this anticommons has
required downstream developers to gain "access to multiple patented
inputs to create a single useful product,"1 78 thus creating obstacles to
research and development.1 79
The biomedical anticommons arises in two ways, according to
Heller and Eisenberg. First is through the creation of too many
concurrent fragments of intellectual property rights, as occurs when
gene fragments are patented before the corresponding gene, protein,
biological function, or potential commercial product is identified.'80
Second, reach-through license agreements ("RTLAs") on patented
research tools give rights in subsequent downstream discoveries to the
175. See ARTHUR A. BRIGHT, THE ELECTRIC-LAMP INDUSTRY: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FROM 1800 TO 1947, at 91-93 (1949); Merges & Nelson, supra note 154,
at 885-87.
176. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 154, at 890-91.
177. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
178. Id. at 699.
179. Id. Research tools include "cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models,
growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and cloning
tools (such as PCR [polymerase chain reaction]), methods, laboratory equipment and machines,
databases and computer software." REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH)
WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (Nat'l Inst. of Health, Bethesda Md., June 4, 1998), at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools#exec (last visited July 12, 2002).
180. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 699. This problem has shown signs of being
ameliorated by the PTO's Utility Guidelines, issued in 2000, which provide a more rigorous
threshold of utility that requires a "specific" and "substantial" utility before a patent is issued.
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (Dep't of Commerce Jan. 5, 2001).
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owner of patented inventions utilized in upstream research.'8 ' The
anticommons is created "as upstream owners stack overlapping and
inconsistent claims on potential downstream products."'18 2
Compounding these difficulties, according to Heller and
Eisenberg, participants cannot negotiate around these obstacles
because of the presence in the industry of heterogeneous rights
holders, cognitive biases among researchers, and transaction costs.
First, the field is composed of a diverse array of participants including
universities, government agencies, and biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies.18 3  Even if heterogeneity has been
somewhat reduced by recent integration among the participants 8 4
and greater certainty in the law, 18 5 it still exceeds that in other
industries, which typically lack the combination of public and private
actors and of upstream and downstream innovation.186 Second,
consistent with the prevailing research atmosphere, owners of
upstream biomedical research patents tend to overvalue their
discoveries and disparage claims of their opponents.'87  Third,
significant transaction costs arise from the involvement of public
institutions, the difficulty of valuation, and the need for licensing at
an early stage when the outcome of the project is uncertain. 88
181. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 699. RTLAs take the form of royalties on sales
resulting from the use of the research tool, a license on future discoveries, or an option to acquire
such a license. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 700-01.
184. See Rai, supra note 115.
185. See Lawrence M. Sung & Don J. Pelto, Greater Predictability May Result in Patent
Pools: As the Federal Circuit Refines Scope of Biotech Claims, Use of Collective Rights Becomes
Likely, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1998, at C2.
186. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 700 (noting the contrast between a private
firm, which "is more likely to use intellectual property to maintain a lucrative product
monopoly," and a politically accountable government agency like NIH that "may further its
public health mission by using its intellectual property rights to ensure widespread availability
of new therapeutic products at reasonable prices"); id. at 700-01 (noting reluctance to sue public
sector investigators and higher tolerance of academic laboratories and biotechnology firms of
patent infringement, thus lessening the likelihood of cross-licensing).
187. "Overcommitment by individuals to particular research approaches ensures that no
hypothesis is dismissed too quickly, and skepticism toward rivals' claims ensures that they are
not too readily accepted." Id. at 701. The NIH reports that:
Unrealistic valuations, inspired by occasional cases of institutions earning
extraordinary financial returns, often present an obstacle to prompt dissemination of
research tools.... Those who develop new tools tend to overvalue them, without
taking into account all the other tools necessary to study a particular biological
problem. Moreover, the relative value of research tools is often difficult to predict and
even more difficult to agree upon.
REPORT OF THE NIH WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note 179.
188. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 177, at 700. For a similar recitation of the
difficulties of licensing in the field, see Eisenberg, supra note 115, at 231-48; Arti Kaur Rai,
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Empirical evidence supports both the likelihood and a
diminished apprehension of such an anticommons. A study conducted
in 1997 and 1998 by the National Institutes of Health ("NIH")
Working Group on Research Tools concluded that "[m]any scientists
and institutions involved in biomedical research are frustrated by
growing difficulties and delays in negotiating the terms of access to
research tools."18 9 Scientists wait months or years to carry out
experiments "while their institutions attempt to renegotiate the terms
of 'Material Transfer Agreements' ("MTAs"), database access
agreements, and patent license agreements." 190 Anecdotal evidence
supports the thesis: the chief scientific officer at Bristol-Myers Squibb,
for example, recently indicated that his company was not able to work
on more than fifty proteins that could potentially be involved in cancer
"because the patent holders either would not allow it or were
demanding unreasonable royalties,"'19 and another pharmaceutical
executive complained that his company "ha[s] frustration internally
because we can't do what we consider basic research with a cloned
gene.., at the end of the day, you are cut off from tools, from making
a breakthrough discovery."' 92
On the other hand, a recent study prepared for the National
Academy of Sciences concluded that the worst aspects of an
anticommons have not come to pass because the participants have
created "working solutions" allowing their research to proceed.1 93 Such
solutions include the invocation of an informal "research exemption"
allowing infringement of the patents (which the patentee might elect
not to challenge because of the cost of infringement litigation);
applying the knowledge of the research tool patents outside the
Regulating the Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science 94 Nw.
U. L. REV. 125-29 (1999). Rai and Eisenberg also note that
[e]xchanges of DNA sequences, laboratory animals, reagents, and data that were once
subject to a normative expectation of free access are today subject to license
agreements, material transfer agreements and database access agreements that need
to be reviewed and renegotiated before research may proceed, imposing high
transaction costs long before the research has yielded a likely revenue stream that
would justify these costs.
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public and the Private in Biopharmaceutical Research
157, 160 (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/-
pdlpapers/raieisen.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2003).
189. REPORT OF THE NIH WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS, supra note 179.
190. Eisenberg, supra note 115, at 225.
191. Andrew Pollack, Bristol-Myers and Athersys Make Deal on Gene Patents, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2001, at C2.
192. John P. Walsh et al., The Patenting of Research Tools and Biomedical Innovation, in 9
THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ECON. POLICY BOARD OF THE NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
(forthcoming 2002).
193. Walsh et al., supra note 192.
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United States; and creating public databases, making genomic
information widely available. 194
Depending on the empirical evidence considered, upstream
biomedical research presents the case of either an actual or potential
bottleneck. At worst, the dangers envisioned by Heller and Eisenberg
threaten to block the path of innovation in the field of
biopharmaceuticals. At best, such an anticommons has been alleviated
through the participants' collaboration, with such activities being
crucial to preventing the otherwise imminent bottleneck. In either
case, antitrust law must take such bottlenecks into account when
analyzing licensing in the industry. The next section will delineate the
contexts in which bottlenecks are likely to arise.
c. Bottlenecks and Their Evasion
Bottlenecks in cumulative industries naturally arise in one of
two settings. The first, similar to that in biomedical research, involves
the interrelationship between upstream research and downstream
development. A potential bottleneck is present when commercial
development grows out of upstream research, for the development
cannot take place absent access to the research upon which it is
based.195 As just discussed, some evidence exists that actual
bottlenecks, in the form of significant delays and holdups, have
occurred in the biotechnology industry.' 96 The second setting involves
cumulative incremental innovation based on an initial broad patent. 197
Here, follow-on innovation cannot take place without infringing the
patent, which covers the field. 198 The Marconi, Edison, and Wright
Brothers patents provide examples in this context of stalemates,
194. Id. at 15-17.
195. There is always at least the theoretical alternative of following alternate research
paths. But as the upstream research tool becomes more important and pioneering, the alternate
paths will be less promising (and the courts will grant the patent a broader scope).
196. See supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
197. The reference to "initial" products distinguishes the initial from the follow-on innovation
in the context of the relationship between the two products. The "initial" product, of course,
typically appears in the middle of a long line of incremental improvements and is not actually
the first innovation in the field.
"Broad" cumulative patents are patents that claim an expansive subject matter upon which
the next generation of innovation must rely. In other words, they are patents that would be
infringed if the follow-on innovation were not licensed. The scope of the patent thus informs the
likelihood of infringement and, in turn, the need for collaborative activity.
198. Narrow patented products, in contrast, may not block the field since subsequent
innovators could create the next generation of product without infringing the patent. See supra
notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
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unexploited opportunities, and stifled innovation between pioneers
and improvers.
Intergenerational bottlenecks in either of these two settings
threaten grave danger. By definition, innovation in cumulative
industries proceeds across generations. When the initial patentholder
refuses to allow successors to utilize the patented product, and when
this patent is broad or lies upstream, the path of innovation threatens
to come to a halt. With innovation the key determinant to economic
growth, and with several industries of crucial significance (including
automobiles, biotechnology, semiconductors, and computers) based on
cumulative (and broad and/or upstream) innovation, bottlenecks
present a severe threat to the economy.
Therefore, activity undertaken by patentees and others to
resolve intergenerational bottlenecks should be recognized as
reasonably necessary to promote the path of innovation. Such
recognition is even more crucial given the hurdles to licensing and
other collaborative activities. 199 Licensing, patent pools, joint ventures,
and mergers between upstream and downstream patentees, or
between earlier and later generations of inventors, offer the potential
to circumvent (and, in some cases, have avoided) industry
bottlenecks. 200
Activity resolving the intergenerational bottleneck can take
several forms. Typical is a license, an agreement between two entities
that remain separate, by which the patentee permits another to use or
sell the patented technology or product. Licensing between
participants in upstream research and downstream development, or
between earlier and later generations of broad patented products,
should be encouraged. Where an intergenerational bottleneck is
present, and the license promises to resolve the impasse, the activity
should be found to be reasonably necessary to attain innovation. 20 1
199. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
200. See infra Part III.E.2.b. In certain settings, collaboration between potential competitors
could reduce the diversity of paths to innovation and lead to fewer patent races. See Richard J.
Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis:
The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 591 (1995). But where the initial patent
in an industry marked by cumulative innovation is broad or lies upstream from commercial
development, there are no other realistic non-invent-around paths to innovation: either (1) the
cost and inefficiency of inventing around the patent are prohibitive or (2) there are no alternate
paths to innovation. The likely and devastating danger in such settings is that no follow-on
innovation at all will occur in the absence of licensing or other collaborative activity.
201. Cf. Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants, supra note 154, at 34 (contending
that collusion through licensing "allows the first innovator to profit from the externality
conferred on later innovators" when incentives to innovate are implicated); NANCY GALLINI &
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: WHEN IS IT THE BEST INCENTIVE SYSTEM? 16
(UC Berkeley, Working Paper No. E01-303, 2002) (noting that the benefits of broad patents such
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Other, more permanent activity such as joint ventures or
mergers also could resolve bottlenecks by allowing access to essential
patents. For example, a small biotechnology company that has the
patent on a therapeutic target could merge with another small
biotechnology company that has a patent on an assay that can be used
to measure certain (e.g., in vivo) activities. Such a merger would be
reasonably necessary for innovation since it would otherwise be
impossible for either of the companies to create the drug.20 2 On the
other hand, if one company has the target patent and one assay, and
the second company has another assay that can be used at moderately
lower cost, their merger might save resources but would not be
necessary for (and could even inhibit) innovation.
Courts and agencies still should consider the dangers with
which antitrust has traditionally been concerned, such as heightened
market power, as explained in the next part. But the challenged
conduct and the location in the path of innovation will determine the
question of whether the activity is reasonably necessary to resolve
bottleneck-plagued cumulative innovation.
2. Intragenerational Bottlenecks
Bottlenecks also can occur within one product generation.
Where one product is composed of multiple patented inputs, the holder
of any of the patents can hold hostage the development of the product
through infringement lawsuits and injunctions. This problem has been
referred to as a "patent thicket."
a. Patent Thickets
Carl Shapiro has defined a patent thicket as "an overlapping
set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new
as "preventing duplication of R&D costs, facilitating the development of second-generation
products, and protecting early innovators" disappear if licensing fails); David J. Teece,
Intellectual Property, Valuation, and Licensing: Testimony at the Hearings on Competition and
IP Law, supra note 165 (noting that licensing is essential when innovation is "systemic,"
composed of numerous separately patentable elements).
202. The hypothetical bears some resemblance to the acquisition by Vertex Pharmaceuticals
of Aurora Biosciences, which combined Vertex's drug discovery expertise with Aurora's assay
development and screening capabilities. See Climate Right for Accelerated Mergers &
Acquisitions in the Biotechnology Industry, CHEMICAL MKT. REP., Jan. 14, 2002, at 2; Other News
to Note, BIOWORLD TODAY, July 20, 2001. Another analogous example involves Millenium, which
bought four companies in four years in order "to master each step of the drug-discovery process."
Biotech Grows Up, TIME, Dec. 24, 2001.
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technology obtain licenses from multiple patentees."20 3 Patent thickets
have been associated most frequently with the semiconductor
industry, but they also have been observed in the biotechnology,
computer software, and Internet industries.20 4
The existence of a patent thicket increases the power of each
patentholder with a patented part in the product, because each can
block the use of the product by all others. The power is magnified by
the patent system, with its use of injunctions and costly and lengthy
infringement litigation. 20 5 The dangers of the patent thicket are
exacerbated when patents are issued for products that already are on
the market. 20 6 In these cases, the owner of the newly issued patent
holds a commanding position over the manufacturer already in large-
scale production, who cannot easily redesign its product and thus is
forced to comply with the patentee's demands. 20 7
A prominent example of a patent thicket is the semiconductor
industry, in which hundreds, if not thousands, of patents can read
onto a single product. 208 The patents typically cover "aspects of the
circuitry design, materials used to achieve a certain outcome, and the
broad array of methods used to manufacture the device."20 9
Consequently, companies such as IBM, Intel, and Motorola "find it all
too easy to unintentionally infringe on a patent in designing a
microprocessor, potentially exposing themselves to billions of dollars
of liability and/or an injunction forcing them to cease production of key
products."210 This concern is especially relevant for firms that have
made "costly and rapidly-depreciating investments in wafer
fabrication facilities, which inherently utilize a 'thicket' of innovations
developed by many parties."211 As a result, in markets for the design
and manufacture of microprocessors, "broad cross licenses are the
203. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds.,
2001).
204. Id. at 144.
205. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000). Moreover, unlike a positive right to use property, the
negative right to exclude does not give the patentee the ability to practice its invention, but
rather only allows exclusion, which leads to "bargaining with one's 'neighbors'. .. [who] are most
likely to be one's chief competitors ... in technology space." Putnam, supra note 14, at 10.
206. Shapiro, supra note 203, at 119, 121.
207. Id. at 125.
208. Id. at 125-26. Products in the computer software and hardware industries also could
potentially infringe hundreds of patents. See Statement of Dr. David C. Mowery, Roundtable
Discussion at the Hearings on Competition and IP Law, supra note 165.
209. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 158, at 110.
210. Shapiro, supra note 203, at 121.
211. Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 158, at 121.
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norm,"212 with many of the companies licensing most of their patent
portfolio to others. 213
When patent thickets and blocking patents predominate,
activities such as cross-licensing 21 4 and patent pools 21 5 that promise to
resolve the bottleneck should be rewarded. Not only is such activity
crucial to the continuous path of innovation, but it also recognizes the
role of bargaining that is built into the patent system. The rule of
blocking patents, for example, encourages negotiation between the
original inventor and the improver by giving to each "a much larger
stake in the success of the licensing negotiation" and by "increas[ing]
the costs of failing to come to an agreement."216 Patent pools present
an instance of cross-licensing that allows bargaining among repeat
players and that reduces transaction costs. Antitrust, then, should be
cautious before punishing licensing between firms with blocking
patents.
The government agencies have appropriately recognized that
patent pools and cross-licensing agreements often are procompetitive
in "integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction
costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement
litigation."21 7 The arrangements "promot[e] the dissemination of
technology" 218 and allow the participants to share R&D risks. They are
especially crucial when they clear blocking positions in patent
212. Shapiro, supra note 203, at 129. Cross licenses also permit "the more efficient use of
engineers .... better products, and faster product design cycles." Id. at 130.
213. Id. For more detail on the role of licensing in the semiconductor industry, see Hall &
Ziedonis, supra note 158.
A focus on intragenerational bottlenecks like that presented in this section might have
altered the proceedings in the Federal Trade Commission's case against Intel. The FTC
challenged Intel's denial of technical information about its microprocessors to customers who had
sued Intel for patent infringement, allegedly "as a means of coercing those customers into
licensing their innovations to Intel." Compl. 11, Intel Corp. FTC Dkt. No. 9288 (June 8, 1998).
But the FTC neglected to consider the patent thicket prevalent in the semiconductor industry, in
which cross-licensing is crucial and in which Intel's ability to withdraw access to its intellectual
property would tend to make it less susceptible to hold-up by other patentholders. See Randal C.
Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel, 23 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 159, 181, 192
(1999).
214. A cross-license is an agreement by which two firms license to each other the right to
practice the other's patents. See Shapiro, supra note 203, at 127.
215. A patent pool involves a single entity--either a new entity or one of the original
patentholders-that licenses the patents of two or more companies to third parties as a package.
See Shapiro, supra note 203, at 132; see also HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 73, 34.2b, at 34-4
& n.9 (describing a patent pool as a "mutual exchange of patent rights" sweeping more broadly
than a cross-license, and which "encompasses many different patent exchange arrangements").
216. Lemley, supra note 169, at 1062.
217. GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 5.5.
218. Id.
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thickets, as they promise to resolve a bottleneck that otherwise could
prevent the other patentees from manufacturing the product. 219
b. Patent Pools
In part because of concern about antitrust liability, patent
pools have been used only sporadically during the past century. 220 But
when they have been utilized, they often have resolved potential
bottlenecks. Some pools, such as the pool in the sewing machine
industry in the 1850s and the pool in the aircraft industry in the early
twentieth century, solved the problem of different firms owning
patents on "the basic building blocks of the industry's products."221
The aircraft pool was "lauded far and wide as a success" 222 and led to
the major patentholders lowering their royalty rates after the
formation of the pool. 223 Smaller pools developed in industries such as
movie projectors, hydraulic pumps, swimming pool cleaners, and
synthetic polypropylene fiber production. 224
In the past decade, the use of patent pools has increased. The
government agencies recently have examined pools relating to (1)
MPEG-2, a video compression technology underlying the transmission,
storage, and display of digitized moving images and sound tracks;225
(2) DVD-ROM and DVD-video formats describing "the physical and
technical parameters for DVDs for read-only-memory and video
applications";226 and (3) lasers used in photorefractive keratectomy
219. Shapiro, supra note 203, at 123.
220. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1355 (1996). For a discussion of the
history and antitrust treatment of patent pools, see Richard J. Gilbert, Patent Pools: 100 Years
of Law and Economic Solitude 3-27 (May 5, 2002) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
221. Merges, supra note 220, at 1341. The automobile pool present at the turn of the
twentieth century was another significant industry-wide pool. See id. at 1342.
222. Id. at 1346.
223. Id. at 1345.
224. Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent
Pools, in EXPANDING BOUNDARIES, supra note 3, at 142-43.
225. This technology has been applied to high definition television ("HDTV"), Digital Video
Broadcasting ("DVB"), direct broadcast by satellite ("DBS"), digital cable television systems,
multichannel-multipoint distribution services ('"M[MDS"), personal computer video, digital
versatile discs ("DVD"), and interactive media. See Baryn S. Futa, Testimony at the Hearings on
Competition and IP Law Before the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the
Federal Trade Commission (Apr. 17, 2002).
226. Letter from Joel I. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (Dec. 16, 1998), supra note 19. This pool,
between Philips, Sony, and Pioneer, will be discussed in the remainder of the section. Another
pool relating to DVD technology sanctioned by the DOJ involved Toshiba and Time Warner and
covered products manufactured in compliance with the DVD-ROM and DVD-video formats. See
Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Carey R. Ramos, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton and Garrison (June 10, 1999), available at
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("PRK"), a form of eye surgery used to correct vision disorders. 227 The
Department of Justice sanctioned the first two pools, but the Federal
Trade Commission filed a complaint against the third.228
Critical to the agencies' analysis of the pools was the
distinction between essential and substitute patents.229 Patents are
essential if the product or standard at issue in the pool cannot be
produced without infringing the patent. Essential patents "by
definition have no substitutes" 230 and typically are complementary to
each other, possessing a greater value if the licensee can use other
essential patents.231 Substitute patents, in contrast, are not necessary
for the use of a technology in the pool, but present alternate ways of
creating certain products that otherwise would be used in competition
with each other. 232 An example of a substitute patent involves the
inclusion in a pool for DVD standards of one of several alternative
patented methods for placing DVD-ROMs into packaging. 233
The MPEG-2 and DVD patent pools sanctioned by the agencies
were composed solely of essential patents. Essentiality took different
forms, with the patents limited to those technically essential in the
MPEG pool 234 and those necessary "as a practical matter" for
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003). This pool was
similar to the Sony DVD pool but relied on a more independent patent expert, obligated members
to offer patents independently of the pool, and defined essentiality to include patents "for which
there is no 'realistic' alternative." Id.
227. Compl. 8, In re Summit Tech., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9286, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9803/summit.cmp.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2003) (hereinafter
"Summit Complaint").
228. The VISX complaint was ultimately settled, with the parties agreeing to dissolve the
pool and to make pricing and licensing decisions independently. See In re Summit Tech., Inc.,
FTC Dkt. No. 9286.
229. For a discussion of caveats to be applied to the distinction, see infra note 243.
230. Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (Dec. 16, 1998), supra note 19, at 6.
231. Id. Complementary patents "combine to produce or form a single product." Goller, supra
note 163, at 725.
232. Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (Dec. 16, 1998), supra note 19, at 5:
If the Licensors owned patent rights that could be licensed and used in competition
with each other, they might have an economic incentive to utilize a patent pool to
eliminate competition among them [and] . .. could serve as a price-fixing mechanism,
ultimately raising the price of products and services that utilize the pooled patents. [;]
see also Goller, supra note 163, at 725-26 (defining "competing patents" as "those patent
processes or apparatus which produce by different methods the same or similar products or those
products which can be substituted for one another and thus compete for a particular market").
Moreover, the pooling of substitute patents could reduce future innovation when the members of
the pool are required to share their successful R&D, and "each of the members can free ride on
the accomplishments of other pool members" without offering the benefits of clearing blocking
positions that otherwise would obstruct future innovation. GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 5.5.
233. Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (Dec. 16, 1998), supra note 19, at 6.
234. Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (June 26, 1997), supra note 19, at 6, 9.
Essential patents were defined as "any Patent claiming an apparatus and/or a method necessary
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compliance with the DVD standard specifications in the DVD pool.235
Strengthening these conclusions was the determination by an
independent expert that the technology was essential, not only at the
time of the formation of the pool, but also thereafter. 2 6 The finding of
essentiality also was critical for the agencies: the limitation of the
MPEG-2 pool to essential patents, for example, signified that "there is
no technological alternative to any of them and that the [package]
license will not require licensees to accept or use any patent that is
merely one way of implementing the MPEG-2 standard, to the
detriment of competition."237 Other characteristics of the pools
sanctioned by the agencies that were beneficial for innovation
included the ability of participants to license the technology outside
the pool in a nondiscriminatory manner, the restriction of grantback
clauses to essential patents and to licensing on a nonexclusive basis
with fair and reasonable terms, and the imposition of reasonable
royalty rates.238
The Summit-VISX pool, on the other hand, was composed not
of essential patents but of competing patents, according to the FTC. As
the Complaint alleged: "in the absence of the [pool agreement], VISX
and Summit could have and would have competed with one another in
the sale or lease of PRK equipment by using their respective patents,
for compliance with the MPEG-2 Standard." MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License § 1.18 (cited in id.
at 10 n.4).
235. Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (Dec. 16, 1998), supra note 19, at 2. The
Department of Justice understood the definition to encompass "patents which are technically
essential-i.e., inevitably infringed by compliance with the specifications-and those for which
existing alternatives are economically unfeasible." Id. at 11 n.8.
236. Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (June 26, 1997), supra note 19, at 3, 6
(regarding the MPEG-2 pool: 'The continuing role of an independent expert to assess essentiality
is an especially effective guarantor that the Portfolio patents are complements, not substitutes.");
Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (Dec. 16, 1998), supra note 19, at 2.
237. Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (June 26, 1997), supra note 19, at 6
("rhe limitation of the Portfolio to technically essential patents, as opposed to merely
advantageous ones, helps ensure that the Portfolio patents are not competitive with each other
and that the Portfolio license does not, by bundling in non-essential patents, foreclose the
competitive implementation options that the MPEG-2 standard has expressly left open.").
238. Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (Dec. 16, 1998), supra note 19, at 3, 4, 6,
8-9; Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (June 26, 1997), supra note 19, at 4, 6, 7, 9.
The restriction of grantback clauses to essential patents renders it "unlikely that there is any
significant innovation left to be done that the grantback could discourage." Id. at 8.
A patent pool that has similar rules on essential patents (a patent is essential if one or more
of its claims is infringed by compliance with or implementation of the standard) and that uses
independent patent experts is the IEEE 1394 Standard, an external bus standard supporting
data transfer rates of up to 400 Mbps (400 million bits per second). See Jeanne Clark et al.,
Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology Patents? 15-16 (Dec. 5, 2000)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patent-
pool.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2003).
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licensing them, or both."239 The arrangement also required the
participants to pay a $250 fee to the partnership each time a PRK
procedure was performed. Summit and VISX each charged their
respective sublicensees a $250-per-procedure fee, and because the
firms were required to pay this amount to the pool, neither party had
an incentive to reduce the fee. 240 Unlike the MPEG pool, for which the
individual members could make the patents available outside the pool,
both VISX and Summit gave up "the right to unilaterally license"241
any patent contributed to the pool. Further, each party could prevent
the pool from licensing any of the patents to others that manufactured
PRK equipment. 242
The agencies' distinction between essential and substitute
patents closely tracks the bottleneck issue discussed throughout this
Article. A patent that is essential to the technology is akin to a
blocking patent, one that cannot be avoided in the patent thicket. In
contrast, competing patents are not necessary for the use of the
technology and therefore do not create intragenerational bottlenecks.
Arrangements between competitors relating to such patents thus
threaten competitive harm without resolving bottlenecks. 243
239. Summit Compl., 8. The Complaint also claims that 'VISX and Summit would have
engaged in competition with each other in connection with the licensing of technology related to
PRK." Id.
240. Id. $ 12; see Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From
Adversaries to Partners, 28 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 17 (2000).
241. Summit Compl. 9.
242. See id. 10. The FTC also challenged VISX's withholding from the PTO of "articles,
patents, and patent applications that [it] knew were material prior art." Id. 16. As the agencies
had earlier indicated, a licensing scheme "premised on invalid or expired intellectual property
rights will not withstand antitrust scrutiny," as restrictions on licensors or licensees
unaccompanied by legitimate intellectual property rights "are highly likely to be
anticompetitive." Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (June 26, 1997), supra note 19,
at 5; see also Letter from Joel L. Klein to Gerrard R. Beeney (Dec. 16, 1998), supra note 19, at 5.
243. It is not the case that every patent in the pool needs to be essential for the pool to
promote innovation. "M]anufacturing steps, calculations, or processes that must be
accomplished in order to produce the defined product, but which may be accomplished in more
than one way" present a class of substitute patents that could clear antitrust review. See Gerrard
R. Beeney, Pro-Competitive Aspects of Intellectual Property Pools: A Proposal for Safe Harbor
Provisions, Testimony at the Hearings on Competition and IP Law, supra note 165, at 6. In other
words, to produce the downstream product defined by the license field of use, one of the
substitutes must be infringed. Id. at 7. Moreover, the test distinguishing between essential and
substitute patents can be applied by the courts and the agencies. See Merges, supra note 224, at
158 (noting that the pools considered by courts "seem to fall fairly readily" into "pools which
reduce the volume of licensing and lead to greater technological integration" and "pools that do
not add to interfirm technology adoption").
Even if patent claims do not always neatly fall into the categories of blocking and substitute
claims, see HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 73, § 34.2, at 34-8 to 34-10, the concept is valuable to
focus the analysis on the relationship among the patents. And even if the full effect of a blocking
patent is felt after the infringement lawsuit is filed or the injunction is issued, prelitigation
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Antitrust should recognize (as it recently has) the benefits of
cross-licensing and patent pools that resolve bottlenecks. 244 The
prevalence of such arrangements, in the context of potentially
treacherous roadblocks and in industries that are innovating,
recommends deference to the activity. 245
activity will be affected since potential infringers typically will not be certain when their
infringement will be litigated and thus will tend to avoid activity that may lead to debilitating
lawsuits. Consequently, they will refrain from infringing activity, with the result that the
blocking patents thwart innovation.
244. Cf. Merges, supra note 224, at 1391 (recommending that antitrust enforcement actions
against patent pools "consider the enormous transaction cost savings they engender").
245. As the MPEG-2 and DVD pools reveal, the issue of standard-setting often arises in
patent pools. A standard is "any set of technical specifications which either does, or is intended
to, provide a common design for a product or process." HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 73, § 35.1a,
at 35-3. There are two types of standards: (1) quality and safety standards (which "define the
design or performance characteristics that products must have either to be sold in the market
(e.g., automobile emissions standards) or to obtain 'approval,' 'certification,' or 'listing' by a
standard-setting body (e.g., the Underwriters Laboratories' seal)") and (2) interoperability or
interface standards (which "specify whether and how one type of product will be able to fit or
communicate with other products (e.g., gauge of railroad tracks, color TV transmission
standards, or computer operating system interfaces with applications programs)"). James J.
Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and High-Technology Industries,
64 ANTITRUST L.J. 247, 247 (1995). Although standards may not fit automatically into the
patent-based tripartite innovation construct introduced in this Article, they often will implicate
similar concerns, particularly in resolving bottlenecks.
At their most beneficial, interoperability standards serve functions analogous to patent pools
consisting of essential patents. Even if competing standards are not formally as dangerous as
blocking patents, the infringement of which threatens costly litigation, the adoption of
interoperability standards (which increase competition within the standard) promises benefits
similar to the cross-licensing of blocking patents in paving the way for subsequent innovation. It
is also promising that most standard-setting activities have taken place in industries that have
experienced substantial patent bottlenecks and in which interoperability is particularly crucial:
the software, Internet, telecommunications, and semiconductor industries. See Mark A. Lemley,
Intellectual Property Rights and Standard Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1952 (2002).
Standards are critical, for example, where a product category "would fail to take off in the
absence of standardization." Carl Shapiro, Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or
Collusion?, in EXPANDING BOUNDARIES, supra note 3, at 89. This failure could occur if consumers
delay making purchases so that they will not be locked into a technology that eventually loses
the standards war. Id. In these settings, where interoperability is practically essential to the
operation of a market, the situation approximates that of circumventing patent bottlenecks, and
so activity promoting the selection of a standard would be reasonably necessary to attain
innovation. Such activity includes the intellectual property rules of standard-setting
organizations, which typically require the disclosure of intellectual property that might be
implicated by the standard and mandate royalty-free or reasonable and nondiscriminatory
("RAND") licensing. These rules reduce the likelihood of a patentee holding up the standard ex
post.
Other types of activity involving standards, however, are less analogous to circumventing
patent bottlenecks. Analysis of quality and safety standards often requires consideration of both
the benefits and costs of the activity. See David A. Balto, Speech at the Cutting Edge Antitrust
Law Seminars International, Standard Setting in a Network Economy (standard setting "can
thwart innovation or entrench an older standard when a newer, better, or more widely accepted
technology is available" or, if overinclusive, can lead to "reduced differentiation, dampened
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Because of the more dangerous position of patents in
intergenerational or intragenerational bottlenecks, activity that
promises to circumvent the bottlenecks is reasonably necessary for
innovation. Any concerns that antitrust has with the price or output
effects of licensing agreements must be considered in the context of
innovation in the industry, which might not continue-or, at a
minimum, would be significantly and expensively delayed-absent
agreements clearing patent landmines on the path of innovation.
The first two stages of innovation are just as crucial. The
patented products that eventually form bottlenecks might never come
into existence absent incentives to create the product and the ability
to recover the investment incurred in developing the product.
Antitrust thus must recognize activity that is reasonably necessary for
these stages of innovation. The next part incorporates the finding on
reasonable necessity into the overall antitrust analysis.
IV. INCORPORATION OF TRIPARTITE-INNOVATION FINDING INTO
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
Once the court determines whether the activity is reasonably
necessary for tripartite innovation, it can conduct the overall analysis.
If the activity is not reasonably necessary, then the defendant's
justifications based on the patent system will not apply. Other
justifications-say, preventing free riding or enhancing quality-may
apply, and, in any event, the activity will not constitute an antitrust
violation unless there are substantial anticompetitive effects. 246 But
incentives to innovate, and potential entrenchment of an inferior standard"), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/standardsetting.htm, at 2 (last visited Mar. 8, 2003). These
standards cannot summarily be determined to be reasonably necessary for innovation.
Finally, certain activity related to standard setting will present easy cases, as it will not only
not be necessary for innovation, but also will lack any procompetitive justification, often
constituting an antitrust (or other type of) violation. Activity falling into this sphere includes (1)
misleading a standard-setting organization regarding the scope of a firm's intellectual property,
see Dell Computer Co., C-3658 (May 20, 1996) (consent order) (noting that for standard designed
for Video Electronics Standards Association ("VESA") for local bus to transfer instructions
between computer's CPU and peripherals, Dell, after having twice certified that it did not have
intellectual property rights that would conflict with the standard, asserted that the standard
selected infringed its patent); (2) packing a meeting to block an amendment that would have
benefited a competitor, see Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 496-
97 (1988); and (3) declining to certify a product solely because it was patented, see Am. Soc'y of
Sanitary Eng'g, 106 F.T.C. 324 (1985) (standard-setting organization refused to approve new
toilet tank fill valve that could lower manufacturing costs, was safer, was more durable, and
would better conserve water to protect existing manufacturers).
246. To the extent that the defendant justified its activity based on its patents and that
activity is found not to be reasonably necessary for innovation, the reliance on patents more
likely will be a cover for anticompetitive activity.
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the court need not embrace the rationale for deferring to the patent
system.
If the activity is reasonably necessary, then the defendant will
have a powerful defense. The role of the justification based on
reasonable necessity for tripartite innovation will be more significant
than the role for the defendant's justifications under current analysis.
Antitrust courts today focus primarily on allocative efficiency, with the
result that price and output are the key ingredients in the analysis.
The defendant's justifications might explain the reason for the
anticompetitive effects, but they generally will not push in the
opposite direction (i.e., of lower price and higher output). Positing
innovation as the centerpiece of the analysis will lead to a stronger
role for the defendant's justification centered on innovation. Although
the anticompetitive inquiry still will consider the effects on price and
output, innovation will be analyzed both for its anticompetitive (e.g.,
reduced innovation) and procompetitive (e.g., innovation-based
justifications) effects. The greater role for the new justification will be
detailed in this part, which sets forth the proposed antitrust
framework for the three main offenses of monopolization, agreements,
and mergers.
A. Monopolization
Section 2 of the Sherman Act requires an antitrust plaintiff to
show monopoly power and "the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power."247 Although the first prong confused courts throughout
the twentieth century (which typically considered a patent to confer
monopoly power),248 it is the second prong that currently presents the
greatest difficulties.
247. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (offense requires "(1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident").
248. A patent gives its owner the right to exclude others from technological substitutes for
the invention, while the antitrust market encompasses products that consumers treat as
economic substitutes. The two frequently will not overlap. See Gallini & Trebilcock, supra note 4,
at 22 (noting that in a survey of patent licensors, there were no close substitutes for the patented
product in only twenty-seven percent of the cases; there were more than ten competitors in more
than twenty-nine percent of cases); Dam, supra note 5, at 250 ("[L]eading companies may obtain
1,000 or more patents in a single year, and yet many such firms are unlikely ever to obtain even
a single monopoly in any market.").
Courts also would benefit from applying section 2 to true monopolists, rather than to parties
who unsurprisingly have significant power in "markets" defined by their own products. See
Carrier, supra note 1, at 779 (criticizing the ruling in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), that "made every manufacturer of a durable product requiring
servicing or parts a potential monopolist").
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The lack of clear direction from the text of the statute249 and
the legislative history250 has led courts to employ an array of
conflicting and confusing tests for monopolization. These tests have
been focused on such considerations as the intent of the defendant, 251
a change in the market,252 the presence of an "essential facility," 253
practical immunity from the antitrust laws, 254 and a failure to defer to
the intellectual property system. 255 The resulting confusion becomes
particularly dangerous when the tests are applied to patent-based
activity. The exclusion that is the foundation of the patent system
often appears suspicious when viewed through monopolization-tinted
glasses.
Particularly when the challenged activity is based on a patent,
a focus on the defendant's legitimate business justifications is
required. This Article proffers a new justification to a section 2 claim
that applies if the activity is reasonably necessary to attain tripartite
innovation. Activity that is reasonably necessary for any of three
crucial stages of innovation has a substantial justification, one that is
essential to the operation of the patent system and, indirectly, to the
growth of the economy. Activity that is reasonably necessary to
achieve innovation should be rewarded or, at a minimum, should not
be punished, least of all with the heavy stick of the monopolization
offense.
The presence of reasonable necessity to achieve tripartite
innovation should be sufficient to absolve a defendant from liability
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.25 6 The finding of reasonable
necessity demonstrates that the defendant has proffered a sufficient
explanation for its action, which is linked to innovation. Even if the
activity increases price or reduces output, the importance of the
249. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (prohibiting parties from "monopoliz[ing], [ ] attempt[ing] to
monopolize, or combin[ing] or conspir[ing] ... to monopolize").
250. See Carrier, supra note 1, at 808 (stating that in adopting the Sherman Act, members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that the term "monopoly" was not intended to apply to
someone "who merely by superior skill and intelligence" amassed a significant share of the
market, but rather was meant to encompass "the sole engrossing to a man's self by means which
prevent other men from engaging in fair competition with him") (citations omitted).
251. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. ("Kodak II"), 125 F.3d 1195,
1202 (9th Cir. 1997).
252. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604 (1985).
253. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1269 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated
by 195 F.3d 1346, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
254. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. ("Xerox"), 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
255. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
256. As a reminder, activity that is not based on a valid patent will not receive the benefit of
the test based on reasonable necessity. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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activity in achieving innovation predominates and should preclude a
finding of "willful acquisition or maintenance" 257 of monopoly power.
Such an approach is supported in several respects.
First, the approach emphasizes the critical factor of whether
the monopolist's conduct has an efficiency justification. 258  The
operative test applied by courts asks whether the conduct constitutes
"willful acquisition or maintenance" of monopoly power, on the one
hand, or "growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident," on the other.259
Although the challenged activity will not always fall clearly on one
side of the line, patent-based activity that is reasonably necessary for
innovation is far closer to an efficiency justification, a "superior
product," and "business acumen" than to the "willful acquisition or
maintenance" of monopoly power. The test also is consistent with
courts' rulings that have upheld monopolists' alterations of products
that affect complementary products, 260 introductions of new products
that have the effect of injuring competitors, 261 and failures to
"predisclose" their products to competitors. 262
Second, the activity challenged under section 2 often will
directly implicate exclusion, the foundation of the patent system.
Competitors denied use of a patented product often will claim
monopolization, and the courts cannot be left to apply a test that
would require them to balance the concrete effects on such competitors
against a more ethereal look to the purposes of the patent system.
Immunity for reasonably necessary activity ensures that courts will
257. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
258. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985)
("If a firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,' it is fair to
characterize its behavior as predatory."); Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155
(1951).
259. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
260. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 286 (2d Cir. 1979)
("[it would be difficult to fault Kodak for attempting to design a [new] film that could provide
better results than the old film.").
261. See, e.g., Cal. Computer Prods. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979) (IBM could
"redesign its products to make them more attractive to buyers .... [It] need not have ...
constricted its product development so as to facilitate sales of rival products."); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 440-41 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (upholding modification by IBM
of a plug device as a justifiable innovation even though it prevented the operation of interfaces
with competitors' peripheral devices), aff'd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th
Cir. 1980).
262. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281 ("If a firm that has engaged in the risks and
expenses of research and development were required in all circumstances to share with its rivals
the benefits of those endeavors, this incentive [to innovate] would very likely be vitiated.
Withholding from others advance knowledge of one's new products, therefore, ordinarily
constitutes valid competitive conduct.").
20031 1101
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1047
consider patentees' recovery of their investment, the purposes of the
patent system, and the promotion of innovation.
Third, the test is consistent with the relative error costs of
applying antitrust analysis by reducing the likelihood of false
convictions. 263 This is particularly beneficial since (1) agreements with
competitors are not implicated in unilateral conduct, (2) it is often
difficult to distinguish predatory behavior from business success, and
(3) courts have not had much success analyzing activity based on
exclusion. 264 Moreover, the test promises greater certainty and
predictability in an unclear area of the law. 265
263. The "error costs" approach draws on the often-voiced contention that false convictions
(in which a defendant is wrongfully found guilty of, say, monopolization) are more harmful than
false acquittals (in which the defendant is wrongfully exonerated). Several arguments support
such a contention.
First, false convictions may increase litigation and encourage plaintiffs to redress their
grievances in court. This consequence is particularly true where the act challenged is based on a
patent's right to exclude, which plaintiffs may always view as a justified trigger for a lawsuit.
Second, and relatedly, such errors may encourage monopolists to compete less vigorously and to
enter into agreements with their competitors. Third, false convictions cannot be remedied by the
marketplace--once the defendant is found guilty, it may be forced to leave the market or, at a
minimum, will likely be much weaker than it had been (and should have been). Nor can the
deterrent effect of such convictions on innovation easily be corrected. False acquittals, on the
other hand, often (though not always) can be remedied through the marketplace, as exonerated
monopolists are still subject to the demands of the market, particularly in high-technology
markets, in which the tide of competition continually threatens to erode monopoly. See generally
Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards
and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 30-33 (1999). The costs of false convictions are even
greater where they affect not only the competition process but also the incentives underlying the
patent system.
264. See supra notes 251-55 and accompanying text; cf. Teece & Coleman, supra note 68, at
812-14, 823 (expressing doubt that antitrust can grapple with increasing returns and can
improve network effects markets and stating that "the traditional hallmarks of monopoly
(reduction in output or increases in price) are rarely seen" in high-technology industries).
265. See supra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
Such a standard can be applied by courts, which either can dismiss a case upon a finding of
reasonable necessity or, for cases in which the defendant cannot show reasonable necessity, can
consider other non-patent-based justifications along with the anticompetitive effects of the
activity.
The test builds upon the approach offered in Carrier, supra note 1. In the earlier work, the
relevant industry had a more dispositive effect. There, the presumption that patent-based
activity did not constitute monopolization could be rebutted (subject to the defendant's
demonstration of innovation in the market) if the activity took place in an industry (e.g.,
Internet, computer software) in which competition, and not patents, was the catalyst for
innovation.
The test proposed in this Article, appropriate for an approach applying to the entirety of
antitrust law (which encompasses numerous types of potential activity), adopts as its central
focus the activity at issue. The governing framework analyzes the relationship between the
activity and the attainment of innovation. The industry involved will affect this determination
(as in, for example, the issue of whether the activity is necessary to create the product), but will
not have as dispositive an effect.
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As an example, several courts have considered the situation in
which an owner of a machine with a patented part refuses to license
that part to competitors. 266 The product typically is a diagnostic part
that an organization providing service or parts for the patentee's
product would find helpful. 267 Where such an owner licenses the part
itself, it will usually satisfy the second stage of reasonable necessity,
as the activity will help it recover the expenditures it incurred in
developing the product. 268 Even if competitors are disadvantaged by
not obtaining access to the product, the monopolist's exploitation of
the patent is necessary to the process of innovation. 269 Reasonable
necessity thus would replace courts' current analyses, which provide
practical immunity for patentholders 270 or offer presumptions that can
be rebutted based on the defendant's subjective intent 271 or on other
unspecified grounds. 272
B. Agreements
Section 1 of the Sherman Act targets agreements among
competitors and prohibits "unreasonable" restraints of trade.27 3 Other
than a small class of agreements that are deemed per se unlawful
because they lack any competitive justification,274 most agreements (in
particular, those involving patents) are considered under the "Rule of
266. See, e.g., In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. ("Xerox"), 203 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co. ("Kodak II"), 125 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th
Cir. 1997); Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1153 (1st Cir.
1994).
267. See id.
268. In contrast, where the development costs are minimal, the patentee suppresses the
patent, or the patentee's exclusion lacks an efficiency justification (such as where a licensee could
exploit markets unserved by the patentee), reasonable necessity might not be met, requiring
courts to examine more thoroughly whether the activity constitutes monopolization.
269. To the extent these cases also involved the tying of diagnostic parts to service, the
finding on reasonable necessity would not necessarily dispose of the analysis. The tying of an
unpatented product to a patented one may not be reasonably necessary for innovation. Thus, any
procompetitive justification for the arrangement would need to be considered in the context of
the typical tying analysis, which examines the existence of two products, coercion, market power
in the tying product market, and an effect on commerce in the tied product market. See supra
note 74.
270. Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1322.
271. Kodak II, 125 F.3d at 1195.
272. Grumman, 36 F.3d at 1147.
273. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58, 87 (1911).
274. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218, 224 n.59 (1940). For a
discussion of per se treatment applied to agreements between manufacturers of branded
pharmaceuticals and makers of generic drugs, see supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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Reason."275 Courts applying the Rule of Reason consider both the
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the arrangements.
Although courts traditionally have claimed to balance the two effects,
in reality they apply a burden-shifting approach, by first examining
whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a substantial anticompetitive
effect, then by the defendant next showing a procompetitive
justification, and then--only in the handful of cases that survive these
stages-by balancing the two. 276
If the plaintiff demonstrates a significant anticompetitive
effect, the court then considers procompetitive justifications, such as
limiting free riding, enhancing quality, encouraging dealer
investment, or allowing a new product to be developed. 277 This Article
adds to the mix a new justification, which applies if the activity is
reasonably necessary for tripartite innovation. It also shifts the
balance in the direction of favoring such a justification.
The balancing of anticompetitive effects and the new
justification is not to be an unpredictable, even-handed tallying by
which increased price and reduced output are weighed on a level scale
against reasonable necessity for tripartite innovation. Rather, the
reasonable necessity side of the scale will be weighted more heavily,
with a higher burden on the plaintiff, who will need to show that the
anticompetitive effects on price or output significantly outweigh
reasonable necessity for tripartite innovation. 278  Although only
extreme increases in price or reductions in output would outweigh the
defendant's innovation-based justifications, supported allegations of
reduced innovation 279 would (because of the importance of innovation
275. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1979); Cont'l
T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
276. See Carrier, supra note 93, at 1268 (finding that courts disposed of eighty-four percent
of Rule of Reason cases in the modern era at the first stage on the grounds that the plaintiff
could not demonstrate an anticompetitive effect).
277. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
278. Significant outweighing denotes exceeding by a measurable amount, perhaps
(quantifying the unquantifiable) a seventy-to-thirty ratio.
279. In contrast to increased price and reduced output, allegations of harm to innovation
frequently will be less concrete, taking the form of arguments that, absent the defendant's
activity, others would have developed even better products. See John E. Lopatka & William H.
Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 367, 371
(2001). The difficulty of proving this counterfactual makes support for the allegation crucial.
The case that the Department of Justice brought against Visa and MasterCard provides an
example of what thwarted innovation might look like. The DOJ alleged that the entities' dual
governance structure, by which banks have "formal decision-making authority in one system
while issuing a significant percentage of its credit and charge cards on a rival system," prevented
the two companies from "mov[ing] forward in the 1980's with plans to convert credit cards from
the prevailing magnetic stripe technology to 'smart' cards with embedded computer chips."
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 328, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The failure to
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for the inquiry) be considered as seriously as the reasonable necessity
justification. On the other side, a less robust finding of reasonable
necessity-such as a less cogent recovery of investment in an industry
in which it is difficult to invent around the product, or a less-than-
critical need for collaboration in creating the product-could be
outweighed by significant anticompetitive effects.
Such a formula would clarify that innovation should take
priority over allocative efficiency. Activity that is reasonably necessary
for innovation is to be encouraged, even at the expense of modest
increases in price or reductions in output. Such an innovation-
weighted balance would best promote the purposes of the patent and
antitrust systems and the growth of the economy. Imposing an
asymmetric balance would force courts to recognize the importance of
innovation and to apply heightened deference to innovation-promoting
activity. Weighting the balance also gives courts a default position,
removing from the calculus cases in which the two effects are in
equipoise. 28 0
To pick an example, cross-licenses and patent pools are
reasonably necessary to circumvent bottlenecks in the semiconductor
and biotechnology industries. As long as the arrangements actually
target the thicket of blocking patents, they will satisfy the test of
reasonable necessity. If, on the other hand, competitors combine
substitute patents or make half-hearted (i.e., not through independent
embrace a new and superior technology could, in fact, demonstrate anticompetitive effects on
innovation, effects that should be weighed as heavily as reasonable necessity for tripartite
innovation. But the evidence in the case did not appear to support the allegation that the
arrangement blocked innovation and prevented a better technology from being used. See id. at
350 (finding that "neither Visa nor MasterCard has been able to demonstrate a viable business
case for the wide-scale implementation of smart cards in the United States"); id. at 348
("Merchants ... did not believe that the extra effort and costs of processing chip cards would be
justified by any real benefit over the recently installed magnetic stripe terminals."); id. at 364
(finding that the companies did innovate, moving from "inefficient, labor-intensive, paper-based
systems to sophisticated electronic systems," upgrading their systems, and providing fraud and
loss controls).
280. Under the proposed test, the difficult cases would shift to the setting in which
anticompetitive price increases and output reductions outweigh the innovation benefits of the
activity. (Again, anticompetitive effects on innovation will be weighed equally with
procompetitive innovation benefits.) But at least these decisions-which are unavoidable in any
analysis incorporating the effects of activity on different outputs such as price and innovation-
will occur where their effect on societal welfare is roughly equal. In contrast, a test that
considers equally the effects on price and innovation would underemphasize the significance of
innovation and overemphasize that of price effects. The asymmetric balance thus reserves roles
in the analysis for price and output, but requires a greater magnitude for such effects to
outweigh the crucial benefits from innovation.
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patent experts) attempts to demonstrate the presence of blocking
patents, the test of reasonable necessity will not be met. 28 '
Once reasonable necessity is shown, the activity most likely
will not constitute an antitrust violation. The intensity of the
reasonable necessity finding is strong, as the arrangement resolves a
particularly dangerous bottleneck that would otherwise block the path
of innovation. The anticompetitive effects, on the other hand, of,
perhaps, the exclusion of a competitor or an increase in price28 2 are not
on the same level, let alone significantly higher than the benefits.
Anticompetitive effects would predominate only where, for example,
(1) there is an adverse effect on innovation (as in the failure to
embrace available, superior technology 28 3 or the use of exclusive
grantback provisions that expansively cover not only essential but also
competing patents), (2) the participants exclude from the arrangement
small competitors whose participation would be essential in resolving
bottlenecks, or (3) a patentee or licensee increases the price of its
product by a staggering amount. 28 4 But in most other cases, the
reasonable necessity for tripartite innovation of cross-licensing and
patent pools in the semiconductor and biotechnology industries will
outweigh any anticompetitive effects.
Similarly, many other license agreements will not constitute
antitrust violations since they will allow the patentee to recover its
investment from creating the product. Patentees typically will not be
so efficient in every aspect of development that they would not benefit
from relying on licensees that are more experienced in certain fields of
281. It bears mention that patent pools in fact have enhanced innovation. For example, the
pool containing MPEG-2 video compression technology, with approximately one hundred patent
families owned by twenty-one licensors, has "assisted hundreds, if not thousands, of enterprises
to enter the various markets for products which employ MPEG-2 technology." Beeney, supra note
243, at 3-4. Without the pool, each of the companies "would be faced with negotiating multiple
licenses, paying multiple royalties, and only guessing at the amount of their ultimate royalty
obligation." Id. Similarly, small and new manufacturers can enter the DVD player market by
licensing the technology from the patent pools at a reasonable rate, with DVD players sold to
consumers today for less than $100. See James J. Kulbaski, Comments on Patent Pools and
Standards for Federal Trade Commission Hearings Regarding Competition and Intellectual
Property, Testimony at the Hearings on Competition and IP Law, supra note 165, at 7-8.
Moreover, innovation has continued after the implementation of the pools. See id. at 7 (stating
that firms continue to develop new digital video standards like MPEG-4 and MPEG-7 that offer
advantages over MPEG-2 and that "new and better DVD standards have been and continue to be
developed such as standards defining recordable DVD, and high-definition DVD").
282. Of course, increased price is the anticipated result of the patent system and of the
ability to recover the investment from creating the product. Only severe increases in price-like
Mylan's raising the price of its product 3200%-will lead to the predomination of anticompetitive
effects. See supra note 148. The test carves out at least this space for pricing because such
effects, even if less critical than innovation, should not be immune from scrutiny.
283. See supra note 279.
284. See Mylan Complaint, supra note 148.
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use or established in particular geographic areas. Licensing to recover
investment in these situations would be reasonably necessary for
innovation. For example, if an inventor of a new technology lacks the
capability to bring a product embodying the technology to market and
therefore grants a larger company an exclusive license to sell the
product, the activity would be reasonably necessary for the creation
(in particular, the commercialization) of the product and would
outweigh any far-from-apparent anticompetitive effects.28 5
C. Mergers
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits a merger or acquisition
whose effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to
create a monopoly. ' 28 6 The market shares of the merging parties are
crucial to court and agency determinations of whether to allow the
merger to proceed. Other factors considered include the ease of entry
in the industry and the level of concentration in the market. Efficiency
justifications for the merger are considered, but they typically make
the most significant difference in cases in which the parties' market
shares are not overwhelming.
Because a merger involves a permanent combination of the
market power of the merging entities, with the most lasting potential
285. A word on settlements between competitors is in order. Settlements often will take the
form of conduct introduced elsewhere in this Article, including license agreements, patent pools,
joint ventures, and mergers. These settlements will receive the treatment appropriate to that
type of activity, as outlined in this part.
The industry involved will often inform the determination of whether the settlement is
reasonably necessary to attain innovation. For example, in the intragenerational bottleneck of
semiconductors or the intergenerational bottleneck occurring between upstream and
downstream innovation in biotechnology, the settlement often will be necessary for innovation.
On the other hand, settlements between pharmaceutical patentholders and generic challengers
that involve a payment to the generic challenger and an agreement to stay off the market for a
period of time have often appeared to constitute strategies for the patentee to extend the patent
term and would not be reasonably necessary for innovation. See supra note 129 and
accompanying text. Settlement provisions that are more likely to be reasonably necessary allow
competition to continue, permit license without restriction, involve payments from infringer to
patentee (rather than from patentee to infringer), and include nonexclusive licenses and lump
sum royalties. See George S. Cary, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements, Testimony
presented at the Hearings on Competition and IP Law, supra note 165, at 12-14.
286. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). Section 7 provides:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no
person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
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for anticompetitive effects, 28 7 and extends over a range of products
that may involve far more than the patent at issue, the market shares
of the entities will still be important. And because critical stages of
innovation precede the introduction of commercialized products,
market power should be determined in reference not only to product
markets, but also to technology288 and innovation markets 2 9-- in other
words, markets for R&D upstream from the commercialized
product. 290
In most cases, the parties' market power will be decisive. For
example, in extremely concentrated markets, or in mergers
consolidating the market from, say, three firms to two, or two firms to
one, a very high burden should be placed on the parties to show the
potent countervailing efficiencies generated by the transaction.291 On
the other hand, where the firms have insignificant market shares, the
merger can proceed. But for cases in the middle, the defendant's
justifications will matter.
This Article proposes the presence of reasonable necessity for
innovation as a recognized efficiency, and it modestly expands the
cases in which it will be considered. The first and third stages of
innovation will present the typical context in which the merger would
be reasonably necessary for innovation. In certain industries or
287. Jorde & Teece, supra note 65 (proposing more lenient standard for collaborative
activities "less integrative and less permanent (and thus less potentially anticompetitive)" than
mergers); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 257-58 (1986) (explaining that
mergers "are more permanent than commercial contracts, and any harm they cause is thus more
lasting").
288. 'Technology markets consist of the intellectual property that is licensed.., and its close
substitutes-that is, the technologies or goods that are close enough substitutes significantly to
constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the intellectual property that is licensed."
GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 3.2.2.
289. Id. § 3.2.3:
An innovation market consists of the research and development directed to particular
new or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and
development. The close substitutes are research and development efforts,
technologies, and goods that significantly constrain the exercise of market power with
respect to the relevant research and development.
290. Expansion of the scope of markets to encompass innovation markets has not materially
altered the agencies' analysis to date. See Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K. Tom, Is Innovation
King at the Antitrust Agencies? The Intellectual Property Guidelines Five Years Later, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 44 (2001) (concluding that "[m]ost of the merger cases that alleged effects on
innovation likely would have been challenged [by the agencies] based on adverse impacts on
competition in markets for existing goods and services").
291. Cf. Pitofsky, supra note 128, at 553 ('Mergers to monopoly or near-monopoly, especially
when the product has already been developed and is near the marketing stage, threaten to cause
short-term anticonsumer effects in intellectual property markets just as they would in markets
generally."); see supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text (discussing mergers in highly
concentrated markets in the pharmaceutical industry).
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markets, the difficulty of creating the product or the small size of the
participants renders combinations necessary to achieve a scale
sufficient to create the product.292 A merger also could resolve
bottlenecks occurring, for example, upstream from the commercialized
product. 293
Efficiencies that courts have considered include synergies, cost
savings, the exploitation of complementary R&D assets and scale
economies in R&D, and the elimination of redundant R&D
programs. 294  Whether the merger is reasonably necessary for
tripartite innovation is at least as important as these rationales. More
likely, because of its direct role in increasing innovation, the new
justification is of even greater significance. Especially when the patent
at issue encompasses a significant portion of the product lines of the
firms, the justification is potent, and the dangers of increased market
power not related to the patented product are reduced. Consequently,
marginally higher market shares can be tolerated and the zone of
markets that, under the current Merger Guidelines, are not quite
"highly concentrated" can moderately expand. The Article proposes
raising the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index's ("HHI") upper threshold of
market concentration for unconcentrated markets from 1000 to
1800295 and that for moderately concentrated markets from 1800 to,
292. See supra Part 11I.C.
293. See supra Part III.E.1.c. Again, the requirement of reasonable necessity has teeth and
will not sanction every merger. For example, a merger between a pharmaceutical patentholder
and a generic challenger that settles a patent dispute between the two should be viewed
critically. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. For another example of a merger where the
parties' claims based on innovation appropriately were scrutinized, see David Balto, The
Efficiency Defense in Merger Review: Progress or Stagnation?, 16 ANTITRUST 74, 77 (2001)
(questioning Heinz's allegation that its proposed merger with Beech-Nut was necessary to
develop new products when it "was the largest baby food manufacturer in the world and had
implemented many of the[ ] innovations elsewhere").
294. See Gilbert & Sunshine, supra note 200, at 597. The Merger Guidelines note that
efficiency claims "relating to research and development are potentially substantial." MERGER
GUIDELINES 4; see also FTC REPORT, supra note 113, at 32 ("[Ilnnovation efficiencies may make
a particularly powerful contribution to competitive dynamics, the national R&D effort, and
consumer (and overall) welfare.").
295. The HHI is calculated "by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all
the participants" in the market. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 294, 1.5. This figure "gives
proportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger firms." Id. The Guidelines
consider markets with a postmerger HHI below 1000 to be unconcentrated; an HHI between
1000 and 1800 to be moderately concentrated (with mergers increasing the HHI by more than
100 points raising significant competitive concerns); and an HHI above 1800 to be highly
concentrated (with mergers increasing the HHI by more than 50 points raising significant
competitive concerns). Id. 1.51. Other factors, such as ease of entry, can affect the analysis. Id.
3.0-3.4.
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perhaps, 2200 or 2600 in cases where the reasonable necessity
justification is demonstrated. 296
For example, imagine a market in the biopharmaceutical
industry composed of firms with market shares of thirty, twenty,
twenty, ten, seven, five, five, and three percent. The HHI premerger is
1908.297 The firms with seven percent and ten percent market shares
merge to combine their research and commercialization capabilities in
order to create a product that they otherwise could not create. 298 The
new HHI of 2048 would be "highly concentrated" under the current
Guidelines, and the increase from the merger would be 140 (well
above the threshold of 50 allowable in such markets). It thus is
questionable whether the agencies would allow the merger to proceed.
The proposed approach would allow the merger. A market with
an HHI of 2048 is not overly concentrated, and an increase from the
merger of 140 is not critically significant. Most significant, the merger
is reasonably necessary to create a product that otherwise would not
be developed, as the cost of creating products in the biopharmaceutical
industry is significant and as this merger, in particular, appears to be
necessary for such innovation. 299
V. CONCLUSION
The divergent paths to increased welfare traversed by patent
and antitrust create difficulties for courts across the entirety of
business activity, from licenses to patent pools to joint ventures to
mergers to refusals to license. This Article offers a paradigm that
allows antitrust courts to consider patent-based activity in a simple,
straightforward test.
The first element of the paradigm involves the selection of
innovation as a common denominator by which the patent and
antitrust systems can be compared. Innovation is the recognized
purpose of the patent system and is a well-supported objective of the
antitrust laws, playing the most significant role of the various
efficiencies in the growth of the economy.
296. See generally Jorde & Teece, supra note 65. The test also anticipates raising the
allowable increase in the HHI from the merger from 50 points in highly concentrated markets to
100 or 150, and from 100 points in moderately concentrated markets to 150 or 200.
297. (30*30) + (20*20) + (20*20) + (10*10) + (7*7) + (5*5) + (5*5) + (3*3) = 1908.
298. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
299. Another acceptable justification would involve the circumvention of an
intergenerational bottleneck where an upstream biotechnology firm merges with a downstream
pharmaceutical company. Such activity promises to address the anticommons in upstream
biomedical research. If the merging parties had similar market shares of seven and ten percent,
the merger would be allowed.
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The second component is a new justification that applies if the
defendant's patent-based activity is reasonably necessary for tripartite
innovation. Such an inquiry ensures that courts will consider the link
between the challenged conduct and each of three independent,
critical stages of innovation.
Third, the Article adjusts standard antitrust analysis,
proposing immunity from the monopolization offense, an asymmetric
balance emphasizing innovation for agreements analyzed under the
Rule of Reason, and a modestly more significant role for the
justification in merger analysis. Such a construct promotes the
purposes of the patent system and is especially useful when the
patent-based activity is critical for innovation. At the same time, it
retains a role for antitrust, which continues to consider
anticompetitive effects, but which no longer will be blinded by
overbroad defenses based on the patent system.
The most important factor in the growth of our economy is
innovation: creating products, allowing patentees to recover their
investment from developing products, and circumventing the
bottlenecks that threaten to block the path of innovation. The
approach offered by this Article increases the possibility of attaining
such beneficial effects, as it prescribes a more prominent and lasting
role in antitrust analysis for the patent system and for the multiple
components of innovation.
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Public Independent Fact-Finding: A Trust-
Generating Institution for an Age of Cor-
porate Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust
R. William Ide III
Douglas H. Yarn 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1113 (2003)
Public distrust in the wake of corporate scandals caused corpo-
rate legitimacy crises for the companies involved and for the mar-
ketplace as a whole. The loss of trust has contributed to an environ-
ment in which traditional responses to allegations of wrongdoing
and incompetence are less effective. Alternatively, organizations en-
gage in "Public independent fact-finding" ("PIFF") by hiring public
figures with reputations for integrity to conduct internal investiga-
tions and to report their findings to the public. This Article describes
the role played by trust, reputation, and social legitimacy in the
health of organizations and examines corporate legitimacy crises
and traditional responses. Identifying factors that undermine the
effectiveness of apologia and other trust-generating institutions, it
explores PIFF as an alternative process and considers the benefits
and inherent problems of attempting to institutionalize the process
better. Focusing on lawyers as fact finders and the American Arbi-
tration Association's new Independent Fact-Finding Service, it ana-
lyzes the procedural and ethical issues associated with possible in-
stitutionalization models. The authors assert that procedures should
ensure the integrity of the process. Ultimately, the public trust in
individuals and entities and in the processes in which they engage is
a precious commodity for institutions in crises. In turn, their reputa-
tions are a public good. Such fact finders are essentially "trustees"
with corresponding fiduciary duties, and it is essential to conduct
these processes to preserve the public's confidence. Although not a
panacea, the PIFF concept may provide a quick, fair, and objective
intervention to resolve controversy based on rumor and innuendo. In
a global society in which public opinion changes rapidly, fact-
finding fills a void in dispute-handling processes between the for-
mal application of law and the informal shaping of public opinion.
